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   The use of human embryonic stem cells (henceforth hESCs) in medicine is a pioneering 
avenue of medical technology, in which the cells that constitute human life in its embryonic 
form are used in medical research and therapy. These powerful medical resources are derived 
by extracting the inner cell mass from a 5 day old in vitro human embryo
1
, destroying the 
embryo in the process. Since the derivation of hESCs currently involves the destruction of 
human embryos, hESC research has been morally opposed on the grounds that the destruction 
of human embryos that the practice involves is morally impermissible.
2
 
    In order to claim that hESC research should be deemed morally permissible, some 
supporters of this research point out that hESCs are typically derived from unwanted embryos 
left over from IVF treatments. These embryos were created for reproductive purposes but 
were ultimately not required, and are usually discarded if they are not used in research, 
without benefit.  Henceforth, I shall refer to the form of hESC research
3
 which involves the 
derivation of hESCs from these unwanted IVF embryos as „standard hESC research‟. 
   It seems possible to argue that standard hESC research should be deemed morally 
permissible in two ways.
4
 First, it might be argued that it is morally permissible to destroy 
embryos which will be discarded without benefit in any case, or which are „bound to die‟.
5
 
Alternatively, it might be argued that it is morally permissible to destroy embryos (regardless 
                                                          
1
 Henceforth, unless otherwise stated, I shall use the term ‘embryo’ to refer to an in vitro human embryo, since 
these are the types of embryo which are destroyed in hESC research. 
2
 For example, see George (2002). 
3
 I use the phrase ‘form of hESC research’ to distinguish the two practices that I consider in this thesis, rather 
than the phrase ‘method of derivation’ because the actual method of extracting hESCs from the embryo is the 
same in both the practices I am considering. Rather, what distinguishes the practices that I am considering is 
the source of the embryos from which the hESCs are derived, and the properties of the hESCs which are 
derived from these embryos, as I shall explain in the next chapter. This is what I mean to distinguish when I 
refer to different ‘forms of hESC research’; although this use is slightly unnatural, it seems to be the clearest 
term to use here.  
4
 Siegel (2008) points this out. 
5
 For example, see Outka (2002). I shall reject this argument in chapter 5. 
4 
 
of whether or not they are bound to die) because the embryo does not have a right to life, and 
destroying them does not violate any other moral constraint that we ought to place on our 
treatment of embryos. 
   However, it has recently been proposed that a new form of hESC research could lead to 
medical benefits which go far beyond those promised by standard hESC research. In this 
alternative form of hESC research, „cloned‟ embryos are created from a donor somatic cell, 
solely for the purpose of deriving hESCs of a specific genetic type. Following the literature, I 
shall refer to the form of hESC research which involves the creation of cloned embryos solely 
for the purpose of deriving specialised hESCs as „therapeutic cloning‟.
6
  
   Since therapeutic cloning involves the intentional creation of human embryos solely for the 
purpose of destroying them in order to harvest hESCs, many people find the practice morally 
abhorrent; this includes both those who support standard hESC research, and those who 
oppose it. On the one hand, opponents of standard hESC research may claim that therapeutic 
is morally wrong because, like standard hESC research, it involves the destruction of 
embryos, a practice which they deem morally impermissible. On the other hand, supporters of 
standard hESC research may claim that therapeutic cloning is morally wrong because it 
involves treating the embryo in a particularly exploitative manner, which, they argue, 
standard hESC research does not involve.
7
 
   With this in mind, it is possible to identify three main positions concerning the moral 
permissibility of these different forms of hESC research. First, conservatives argue that both 
standard hESC research and therapeutic cloning are morally impermissible, since they both 
involve the destruction of human embryos (which they claim is morally impermissible). 
Second, liberals claim that both standard hESC research and therapeutic cloning are morally 
                                                          
6
 It has also been referred to as ‘cloning for biomedical-research’. See The President’s Council on Bioethics 
(2002). 
7
 For example, see Fitzpatrick (2003) 
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permissible, arguing that there is nothing morally wrong with destroying human embryos, or 
intentionally creating them for destruction.  
   Finally, there is also a compromise position between these two extremes. Those who adopt 
the compromise position claim that standard hESC research is morally permissible, despite 
the fact that it involves the destruction of human embryos. However, they also claim that 
therapeutic cloning is morally impermissible; although it may be permissible to destroy 
unwanted IVF embryos, they argue that it is morally wrong to create an embryo for the sole 
purpose of destroying it.   
   In this thesis, I shall argue that this compromise position concerning the moral 
permissibility of different forms of hESC research is tenable. In order to do so, I shall first 
claim that although it may be morally permissible to destroy embryos insofar as they do not 
have a right to life, it can still be coherent to view them as deserving moral respect. I shall 
then argue that one may plausibly view standard hESC research as being compatible with 
affording the embryo proper moral respect, whilst also maintaining that therapeutic cloning is 
incompatible with affording this respect. However, although I shall argue that the 
compromise position is theoretically tenable, I shall also suggest that it is an unappealing 
position; my justification for this conclusion shall be that there are good reasons to support 
the claim that therapeutic cloning is morally permissible even if we concede that it violates 
the moral respect due to the embryo.  
   To begin this thesis, I shall start the first chapter by sketching the medical science 
underlying standard hESC research and therapeutic cloning. I shall then consider the moral 
objections that have been aimed at the practices, before explaining the strategy that I shall 





    In order to understand the different positions concerning the moral permissibility of 
different forms of hESC research, it is crucial to understand what each practice involves. 
Accordingly, I shall begin this chapter by sketching the medical science behind the derivation 
of hESCs in both practices, and make some terminological distinction which I shall use 
throughout the thesis. In the second section of the chapter, I shall survey some of the moral 
arguments that can be used against therapeutic cloning but not standard hESC research (and 
which could therefore be used to justify the compromise position), before explaining in the 
third section why the moral permissibility of therapeutic cloning is such a pressing bioethical 
issue. I shall then conclude this chapter by explaining how I shall defend the tenability of the 
compromise position in this thesis. 
 
        I 
   Stem cells are a unique type of cell, since they are both undifferentiated and indefinitely 
self renewing. This means that they can become a variety of different cell types, and generate 
infinite numbers of these cells.
8
 However, stem cells from different sources differ in their 
degree of plasticity, or potency. Adult stem cells are multipotent; although they are able to 
differentiate into different types of cell, they are typically only able to form cells of the tissue 
in which they reside.
9
  In contrast, hESCs are pluripotent, since they have the capacity to 
generate all types of cell found within a human being.
10
 This makes hESCs derived in either 
                                                          
8
 See Crawford and Turner (2008), p.221. 
9
 See Jell, Bonzani, & Stevens, (2005).  This thought has been challenged by the development of Induced 
Pluripotent Stem Cell (iPSC) technology, which will be discussed later. 
10
 See Crawford and Turner (2008), p.221. Note that these cells are not totipotent, in that they do not have all 
the genetic information necessary to generate new life, since they are not capable of generating extra-
embryonic tissue such as the placenta. See Oderberg (2008), p. 272. 
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form of hESC research a valuable research tool, because they provide researchers with the 
means to generate different types of human tissue purely for drug screening
11
, as well as 
providing new information about the development of genetic, and developmental diseases.
12
  
   In what I have termed „standard‟ hESC research, researchers derive hESCs from embryos
13
 
which were created for IVF treatments but were ultimately not required, and which are 
usually discarded without benefit if they are not used in research. Henceforth, I shall refer to 
these embryos as „unwanted embryos‟.
14
 In order to derive their hESCs, researchers develop 
these embryos in vitro to the blastocyst stage (about 5 days after fertilization). At this point, 
the inner cell mass of the blastocyst which contains the hESCs is removed, destroying the 
embryo in the process.
15
 Henceforth, I shall refer to hESCs derived from unwanted embryos 
as „unspecialised hESCs‟; the reason for this appellation will become clear when they are 
compared to the hESCs derived in therapeutic cloning, as I shall now explain. 
     In therapeutic cloning, an embryo is created via the process of Somatic Cell Nuclear 
Transfer (SCNT) for the purpose of providing a particular type of hESC. I shall henceforth 
refer to embryos created via this process as „SCNT embryos‟. The process of SCNT involves 
enucleating a normal egg cell, and replacing it‟s nucleus with that of an adult donor somatic 
cell. Having replaced its nucleus, scientists electronically stimulate the egg to develop to the 
blastocyst stage, at which point hESCs can be derived (using the same procedure as the one 
used to derive unspecialised hESCs from unwanted embryos described above). Due to the 
nature of the process of SCNT used to generate the embryo, the hESCs from SCNT embryos 
                                                          
11
 See Pouton & Haynes (2007). 
12
 See Sermon et al (2009). 
13
 To avoid confusion, I shall use the term ‘embryo’ throughout to refer to the 5 day old blastocyst from which 
hESCs can be derived. Although there is a distinction between the terms ‘blastocyst’ and ‘embryo’ [See 
Lennox&Lennox (1988)], this difference is inconsequential to my use of the term. 
14
 Since these embryos are usually destroyed if they are not required for reproductive purposes, some writers 
have termed them “doomed embryos”. See Curzer (2004), p. 534. However, I shall explain why this appellation 
is misleading later in the thesis. See footnote 173. 
15





 the same genetic make-up as the donor of the somatic cell;
 
essentially, the 
created hESCs are „cloned‟ from that donor. Accordingly, I shall refer to hESCs derived from 
SCNT embryos in therapeutic cloning as „cloned hESCs‟. To make one final terminological 
distinction, I shall use the unqualified terms „hESCs‟ and „embryos‟ when I mean to refer to 
hESCs and embryos in both forms of hESC research. 
   Having sketched the science behind therapeutic cloning and standard hESC research, in the 
next section of this chapter I shall provide an overview of the moral objections which are 
raised in this area. Although I shall not consider any of these objections in depth, this 




    Some moral objections can be aimed at both therapeutic cloning and standard hESC 
research. The first key moral concern in this area is that the derivation of any sort of hESC 
involves the destruction of human embryos. For some, this fact alone renders both forms of 
hESC research morally impermissible. One justification for such a view is that the embryo 
should be viewed as having an inviolable right to life.
17
 I shall return to this issue in the next 
chapter.  
   However, although some moral objections are applicable to both forms of hESC research, 
therapeutic cloning faces some moral objections which cannot be aimed at standard hESC 
                                                          
16 Although the donor egg is enucleated in SCNT, it still retains some of its genetic identity in the mitochondria 
found in its cytoplasm. Therefore, the resulting embryo is not strictly an identical clone of the somatic cell 
donor. See Hiendleder, Zakhartchenko, and Wolf (2005) for an analysis of mitochondrial effects in SCNT. 
17
 As I explained in the introduction, supporters of standard hESC research may point out here that even if the 
embryo has a right to life, it may still be permissible to destroy it insofar as it is bound to die. I shall return to 
this issue in section IV of this chapter. 
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research. These objections can be used to justify the compromise position concerning the 
moral permissibility of different forms of hESC research, since they give reasons to claim 
that therapeutic cloning is morally impermissible which do not apply to standard hESC 
research. In this section, I shall outline some consequentialist objections which are aimed 
exclusively at therapeutic cloning, before explaining why they will not be the focus of this 
thesis. I shall then outline the moral objection that I shall consider in this thesis. 
   One can identify three
18
 distinct consequentialist arguments against therapeutic cloning. 
First, many see therapeutic cloning as the first stage of a slippery slope to reproductive 
cloning,
19
 which would hypothetically involve the development of cloned embryos to term. 
This objection relies on the assumption that reproductive cloning is itself morally wrong, a 
view which has been defended elsewhere
20
 (using both consequentialist and deontological 
arguments).
 
Granting this assumption, some argue that legitimising the practice of therapeutic 
cloning is morally wrong because it is likely to have the bad consequence of leading to the 
legitimisation of reproductive cloning. Second, Gerrand has argued that therapeutic cloning 
will place unfair pressure on women to donate eggs for this research,
21
 and third, Annas, 




   The common core to these arguments is that they all claim that therapeutic cloning will lead 
to bad consequences for society, or at least some subset of it, which may be sufficient to 
outweigh the possible good consequences of the practice. However, although these arguments 
are of importance when we consider the moral permissibility of therapeutic cloning, I shall 
                                                          
18
 These arguments can be aimed at therapeutic cloning whether the cloned hESCs are intended for research 
or therapy. It is also possible to mount further consequentialist attacks solely upon the clinical use of 
therapeutic cloning. Such objections might claim that such use will result in social inequality. See Maclaren 
(2001). 
19
 For a detailed discussion of this, see the President’s Council on Bioethics (2002), pp. 163-166. 
20
 See Ibid. pp. 96-131 for such an argument. 
21
 See Gerrand (1993). 
22
 See Annas, Caplan and Elias (1996). 
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not consider them here. One reason for this is that consequentialist arguments such as these 
necessarily rely on empirical projections, and are thus reliant on possibly contentious 
contingent factors.
23
 Moreover, it seems that these objections are solely relevant if it is 
assumed that there is nothing wrong with hESC research in itself; if the practice is 
intrinsically wrong, no such projections are needed in order to argue that the practice is 
morally impermissible.  
   As such, in considering the tenability of the compromise position, I shall instead consider 
the argument that proponents of the compromise position might make in order to claim that 
therapeutic cloning (but not standard hESC research) is intrinsically morally wrong, because 
it violates a moral constraint that we ought to place on our treatments of embryos. To preview 
the argument that I shall consider, it might be argued that therapeutic cloning violates the 
moral respect due to an embryo, because (unlike standard hESC research) it violates the 
moral respect that the embryo is due. 
   Since this objection only seems to be applicable to therapeutic cloning, it might be asked 
why we should even consider carrying out therapeutic cloning over and above standard hESC 
research, if only the former is deemed morally problematic. I shall answer this question in the 
next section of this chapter, and in doing so, explain why the moral permissibility of 
therapeutic cloning is such a pressing bioethical issue. 




                                                          
23
 Devolder & Savulescu (2006) provide arguments for why the empirical projections that these objections rely 




   There are two medical advantages to carrying out therapeutic cloning in addition to 
standard hESC research.
24
 The first advantage concerns the therapeutic use of hESCs, whilst 
the second advantage concerns the use of hESCs in medical research. 
   The first advantage of carrying out therapeutic cloning, in addition to standard hESC 
research, is that cloned hESCs have distinct therapeutic advantages over unspecialised 
hESCs. One such advantage is that cloned hESCs could potentially be used to develop organs 
for transplantation in a manner which would circumvent two important problems with current 
transplanting practices. The first problem is that there is a shortage of organs available for 
these procedures.
25
 One reason for this is that there is a lack of organ donors, but a further 
contributing factor is that any organ which is used in a transplant must carry a similar genetic 
code to the recipient if it is not to be rejected by the recipient‟s immune system.
26
 This leads 
to the second problem with current transplantation practices; the second problem is that even 
if one succeeds in finding a donor organ that carries a sufficiently similar genetic code to the 
recipient‟s to make the transplant possible, this recipient will still have to take immuno - 
suppressant drugs for the rest of their lives in order to prevent organ rejection.
27
  
   Cloned hESCs could potentially
28
 remedy both of these problems. Cloned hESCs could 
theoretically
29
 be used to generate new organs which would be genetically „tailor-made‟ for 
                                                          
24
 Up to the discussion of iPSCs, this section paraphrases arguments found in Devolder and Savulescu (2006) 
and The President’s Council on Bioethics (2002), pp. 143-150. 
25
 See Abouna (2008). 
26
 See Kadereit (2010), p.2. 
27
 See Ibid, p.2. 
28
 This use of therapeutic cloning has not been successfully carried out in humans, and there remain several 
obstacles to this. However, there has been some success with this technique in other species. See Byrne et al 
(2007).    
29
 Having said this, in a study by Rideout et al, cloned mouse embryonic stem cells were still recognized as 
foreign by recipient mice. The mitochondrial effects on the genetic identity of cloned hESCs (discussed in 
footnote 16) seem to be relevant here. See Rideout et al (2002). I shall return to this issue in chapter 6. 
12 
 
patients, and would therefore not require measures against immune rejection.
30
 Furthermore, 
since these organs would be generated from a single somatic cell of the recipient and a donor 
egg, the availability of such treatments would depend only upon the availability of these cells.
 
 
In addition, cloned hESCs could also be used to regenerate tissue which is susceptible to 
destruction in degenerative diseases for which there is currently no cure, such as Parkinson‟s 
disease.
31
 Therefore, not only might therapeutic cloning allow us to circumvent problems 
which affect the current practice of organ transplantation, but it might also allow for a 
completely new type of regenerative medicine for currently incurable diseases. 
      The second potential advantage of carrying out therapeutic cloning, in addition to 
standard hESC research, is that it would open new avenues of medical research. First, using 
cloned hESCs in research would allow scientists to carry out new research on diseases in 
which research on patients is currently impossible.
32
 For example, in some genetic diseases, 
there are often too few patients to carry out research upon, or it is impossible to safely extract 
the necessary diseased cells from the patient for research.
33
 However, by deriving cloned 
hESCs from SCNT embryos which are „cloned‟ from these patients, it would be possible to 
create an infinite supply of diseased cells, which could be tested to investigate the aetiology 
of the disease, as well as possible therapies.
34
 Second, the study of cloned hESCs could also 
improve our knowledge of early human development and the mechanisms underlying cell 
growth and differentiation.
35
 Finally, the use of this tissue in research would eradicate the 
need to carry out potentially risky drugs tests on both animals and humans.
36
 
                                                          
30
 See Lanza, Cibelli, & West (1999). 
31
 See NIH, (2006). 
32
 See The President’s Council on Bioethics (2002), pp. 146-148. 
33
 Devolder and Savulescu (2006), p. 8. 
34
 See Devolder and Savulescu (2006), pp. 7-9. 
35
 Ibid, p. 8. 
36
 Ibid, p. 8. 
13 
 
    As such, although there may be moral objections to therapeutic cloning, there are also 
significant benefits to consider in its favour.  When we consider the potential benefits of 
therapeutic cloning both in regenerative medicine and in medical research, it is clear that the 
practice has the potential to save millions of lives, and to alleviate a great deal of suffering.  
Crucially, it seems that we cannot reap these potential benefits solely by using unspecialised 
hESCs. The advantage of using SCNT embryos is that researchers can derive patient-specific 
or disease- specific cloned hESCs for therapy or research respectively. In contrast, 
unspecialised hESCs are not genetically diverse enough to provide researchers with the 




   Prior to concluding this section, it should be acknowledged that recent research has 
challenged the idea that we can only obtain patient or disease specific stem cells from SCNT 
embryos. Yu et al were able to genetically reprogram normal adult somatic cells (which are 
only multipotent) to achieve a similar degree of pluripotency as hESCs.
38
 Furthermore, these 
induced pluripotent cells (iPSCs) had the same beneficial properties as cloned hESCs 
(outlined above), since they carried the genetic code of the donor in the same way that a 
cloned hESC does. As such, some have hailed iPSC technology as rendering the moral debate 
concerning therapeutic cloning obsolete.
39
 
   Unfortunately, although using iPSCs would avoid the ethical problems of therapeutic 
cloning considered above, recent studies have shown that there are scientific obstacles to the 
medical use of iPSCs which are not faced by the use of cloned hESCs to the same extent. 
Both iPSCs
40
 and cloned hESCs
41
  are prone to create tumours, a propensity which, inter 
                                                          
37
 Ibid, pp. 12-13. 
38
 See Yu et al (2007). 
39
 See Cibelli (2007). 
40





, currently renders them clinically unviable. Furthermore, the unstable nature of these 
cells also brings into question the validity of modelling complex diseases in research using 
these cells.
43
 However, research has suggested that iPSCs are far more prone to producing 
tumours because of the nature of the genetic manipulation required to dedifferentiate the 
adult somatic cells to pluripotency.
44
    
   As such, it seems that the use of iPSCs in medicine faces additional technical obstacles to 
the use of cloned hESCs.  As long as this is the case, the ethical debate concerning 
therapeutic cloning looks set to continue, and deserves our attention.
45
 Since the evidence 
suggests that the clinical use of iPSCs is a more remote possibility than the clinical use of 
cloned hESCs, it seems that there needs to be a good moral reason to justify abandoning the 
development of therapeutic cloning in favour of developing iPSC technology.
46
 
   To conclude this section of the chapter, therapeutic cloning has the potential to bring about 
great medical benefits. However, it has only the potential to do so; there are still significant 
technical obstacles to the clinical use of the practice. Having said this, it seems that it is 
incumbent upon us to decide upon the moral permissibility of this practice now. There are 
three reasons for this. First, the technical obstacles to its clinical use may not be 
insurmountable; they may potentially be overcome due to breakthroughs made in other 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
41
 See Bongso, Fong & Gauthaman (2008) for a discussion of the carcinogenic nature of cloned hESCs. 
42
 There are still other technical issues to be resolved before this research can be carried out in humans. See 
Nishikawa, Goldstein & Concepcion (2008). 
43
 This point was suggested to me in personal correspondence with Prof. Kenneth Boyd. 
44
See Gutierrez-Aranda, et al (2010). 
45
 Holden and Vogel (2008) argue for this conclusion. It should be acknowledged that this argument implicitly 
assumes that the carcinogenic nature of iPSCs represents a more significant obstacle to the clinical use of iPSCs 
than the obstacles facing the clinical use of cloned hESCs raised by the mitochondrial influence on the genetic 
identity of cloned hESCs (discussed in footnote 16 and 29), and their carcinogenic propensities. Although this 
may seem debatable, Holden and Vogel claim that this conclusion is warranted by the current scientific 
evidence. Therefore, it seems that an investigation into the moral permissibility of therapeutic cloning is still 
required. 
46
 I shall return to this issue in chapter 6. 
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morally permissible research (such as research using cloned animal embryonic stem cells).
47
 
As such, it seems prudent to consider the moral permissibility of therapeutic cloning now, 
before it becomes clinically viable. Second, it may be the case that the technical obstacles 
facing the clinical use of therapeutic cloning could be overcome by carrying out research into 
cloned human embryos. Accordingly, researchers may still wish to carry out therapeutic 
cloning even if it has no clinical use. Therefore, we must consider the moral permissibility of 
the practice, even if it is not yet clinically viable.  
   Finally, one might argue from an economic perspective that we must also consider the 
moral permissibility of therapeutic cloning in order to decide upon our current use of medical 
resources. That is, we must consider the moral permissibility of the practice in order to 
determine whether we may now permissibly use our resources to develop therapeutic cloning 
for clinical use, instead of using them to develop iPSC technology, which is likely to require 
the use of more resources, given the additional technical obstacles facing its clinical use.
48
 
For these reasons, and the nature of the benefits that the practice promises, the question of the 
moral permissibility of therapeutic cloning represents a particularly pressing bioethical issue.  
 
IV 
   Having outlined the moral problems faced exclusively by therapeutic cloning, as well as the 
potential benefits that it uniquely promises, the final section of this chapter will consider the 
three
49
 possible positions on the moral permissibility of different forms of hESC research 
                                                          
47
 I use the example of research using cloned animal embryos for illustrator purposes only; some may also wish 
to claim that research using these embryos is morally impermissible, although this is not a widespread view. 
48
 I shall return to this issue in chapter 6. 
49
 This follows Devolder’s classification. See Devolder (2005b), pp. 170-1. Devolder also highlights another 
compromise position (which I do not consider here) based on the ‘use-derivation distinction’. Here, hESC 
research is restricted in manner that ensures that researchers are not complicit in the destruction of embryos. 
16 
 
outlined in the introduction. Having done so, I shall them explain the strategy that I shall 
adopt in the argument of this thesis. 
   A „conservative‟ position on hESC research is to regard both standard hESC research and 
therapeutic cloning as morally impermissible.
50
 Attempts to justify adopting this position 
often claim that both practices are morally impermissible because they involve the 
destruction of a human embryo. Such claims rely on the assumption that the embryo has a 
right to life, or that we have a moral obligation not to destroy embryos or use them as a 
means, even if doing so would significantly benefit many people. It seems that this position 
may also rely on the assumption that the embryos destroyed in standard hESC research are 
not bound to die; the reason for this is that it might be argued that it is morally permissible to 
destroy something with a right to life, if it is bound to die in any case.
51
  
   In stark contrast, a „liberal‟ position on hESC research is to regard both standard hESC 
research and therapeutic cloning as morally permissible.
52
 This position relies on the 
assumption that we have no moral obligations to the embryo such that it would be morally 
impermissible to create and/or destroy them for any purpose. As was the case with the 
conservative position, the liberal position does not make a distinction between the moral 
permissibility of standard hESC research and therapeutic cloning. 
   The final position outlined in the introduction was a compromise position between the 
liberal and conservative positions. This compromise position is the focus of this thesis‟ 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Countries such as Germany and Italy adopt this position, only allowing research on embryos created before a 
certain date. See Hinxton Group (2011), and Curzer (2004) for discussion.  
50
 This position is adopted by both Austria and Poland (among others) in their policies on hESC research. See 
Hinxton Group (2011). 
51
 See Outka (2002) for such an argument. I shall consider this argument in my defence of the third assumption 
underlying the compromise position that I delineate below. This argument is also pertinent to the alternative 
compromise position which I referred to in footnote 49. See also footnote 175 for discussion concerning the 
pertinence of this argument to the alternative compromise position. 
52
 This position is adopted by the UK and Sweden in their public policies on hESC research (among others). See 
Hinxton Group (2011). 
17 
 
investigation. This position has two commitments; first, that standard hESC research is 
morally permissible, and second that therapeutic cloning is morally impermissible.
53
 It seems 
that the compromise position may be deemed tenable if the following four assumptions are 
sound: 
    
Assumption 1: The embryo does not have a right to life.  
   
     As I explained in the introduction, it is possible to defend the claim that standard hESC 
research is morally permissible in two ways: First, one may claim that the embryos destroyed in 
standard hESC research are „bound to die‟, and that it is morally permissible to destroy something 
which is bound to die. Second, one may claim that it is morally permissible to destroy embryos 
because they do not have a right to life, and destroying them does not violate any other moral 
constraint that we should place on our treatment of embryos. 
   I shall argue that the first way of morally justifying standard hESC research outlined above fails 
in my defence of another assumption underlying the compromise position.54 Assuming that I am 
correct to argue this, it seems that the first commitment of the compromise position (namely that 
standard hESC research is morally permissible) therefore relies in part upon the assumption that 
the embryo does not have a right to life. Having said this, establishing the soundness of this 
assumption is not sufficient for establishing the first commitment of the compromise position; in 
order to establish the latter, one must also argue that standard hESC research does not violate any 
other moral constraint that we should place on our treatment of embryos. 
 
 
                                                          
53
 This position is adopted by Canada, Denmark and France (among others) in its public policy on hESC 
research. See Hinxton Group (2011). 
54
 Namely, assumption 3, which I delineate below. 
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Assumption 2: We can make sense of there being moral constraints upon the way in which 
we treat embryos, without ascribing rights to them.    
 
    If the compromise position is to defend the view that therapeutic cloning is morally 
impermissible, then there must be some way of claiming that the practice of creating embryos 
for research is morally wrong, without claiming that the embryo has a right to life (since this 
has been ruled out by the first assumption).  
 
 
Assumption 3: There is a moral difference between standard hESC research, and 
therapeutic cloning, such that in carrying out the latter, but not the former, we violate the 
moral constraints set out in the second assumption.  
 
   This assumption is required if proponents of the compromise position are to draw a moral 
distinction between the two different forms of hESC research. Conversely, if this assumption 
is false, then the concept of a compromise position between the conservative and liberal 
positions is incoherent; our judgement concerning the moral permissibility of one form of 
hESC research would have to be the same as our judgement concerning the moral 
permissibility of the other, if there is no moral difference between the two.  
   Furthermore, this assumption is also required to complete a defence of the first commitment 
of the compromise position, namely that standard hESC research is morally permissible. 
Although a defence of assumption 1 may warrant the claim that standard hESC research does 
not violate the embryo‟s right to life, a defence of this third assumption is required if 
19 
 
proponents of the compromise position are to claim that standard hESC research does not 
violate any moral constraint that we ought to place on our treatment of embryos. 
 
Assumption 4: It is morally impermissible to fail to act in accordance with the constraints 
delineated in the second assumption. 
 
   This assumption may seem otiose, since the failure to act in accordance with a moral 
constraint might seem to be analytically tied to the concept of moral impermissibility. 
However, part of the argument that I shall make in this thesis is that although therapeutic 
cloning might violate a moral constraint that we ought to place on our treatment of embryos, 
the practice may yet be deemed morally permissible by virtue of the countervailing moral 
considerations in its favour. As such, it is important to make this usually enthymematic 
assumption, which is required in order to establish the second commitment of the 




   Therefore, this chapter has set the scene for my investigation of the tenability of the 
compromise position which permits standard hESC research, but prohibits therapeutic 
cloning, and explained why this question is such a pressing bioethical issue. To conclude this 
chapter, I shall preview the argument that I hope to make in this thesis. 
    I shall argue that the compromise position is tenable by arguing that it is plausible to assent 
to the truth of all four of its underlying assumptions, outlined above. However, although I 
shall argue that the compromise position is tenable, I shall also suggest that it is unappealing. 
My justification for claiming this will be that, although it may be plausible to accept the 
20 
 
fourth assumption delineated above, the justifications for doing so are dubious. Therefore, I 
shall suggest that even if proponents of the compromise position are right to claim that 
therapeutic cloning violates a moral constraint that we ought to set on our treatment of 
embryos, this may not be an adequate basis for the claim that therapeutic cloning should be 
deemed morally impermissible.  
    With this in mind, my strategy in this thesis will be as follows. In chapter two, I shall 
defend the first assumption which underlies the compromise position, namely that the embryo 
does not have a right to life. In chapters three and four, I shall offer a defence of the second 
assumption, that we can make sense of there being moral constraints upon the way in which 
we treat embryos, without ascribing rights to them. To do so, in chapter three I shall offer an 
account of moral respect which can be contrasted with the language of rights, before applying 
this account of moral respect to the question of what we might owe to embryos in chapter 
four.  
   In chapter five, I shall then defend the third assumption outlined above, arguing that there is 
a moral difference between standard hESC research and therapeutic cloning, such that in 
carrying out the latter, but not the former, we violate the moral constraints set out in the 
second assumption. My defence of this third assumption will also include an argument for 
why the embryos destroyed in standard hESC research are not bound to die, the pertinence of 
which I discussed in my delineation of the first assumption underlying the compromise 
position. In the final chapter, I shall consider the fourth assumption in the light of my defence 
of the previous three assumptions. I shall argue that although proponents of the compromise 
position may plausibly claim that it is morally impermissible to violate the respect due to the 
embryo, there are also good reasons for rejecting this claim, especially given certain 
commitments that proponents of the compromise position must make in order to defend the 




   In this chapter, I shall defend the first assumption underlying the compromise position, 
namely that the embryo does not have a right to life. As I explained in the previous chapter, a 
defence of this assumption is required in order to establish, in part, the first commitment of 
the compromise position; namely that standard hESC research is morally permissible. In 
order to argue that the embryo does not have a right to life, I shall first provide a brief 
analysis of what we mean when we describe something as bearing a right to life. Having 
limited the scope of the chapter in accordance with this analysis I shall then examine the basis 
for claiming that the embryo deserves moral protection, in the second section. In the third 
section, I shall go on to reject the argument that the embryo has a life of sufficient value to 
warrant the protection of a right to life. 
 
I 
    It seems that the best way to begin an explanation of what we are doing when we ascribe a 
right to life is to analyse the way we use the term „right‟.
55
 The term arises most obviously in 
the legal domain. Here, to say that I have „a right to x‟ is to say that I am owed x by some 
party according to laws determined by the legislators of my society.  The things that I am 
owed may include both liberties to have or do something, or action from others to ensure that 
I have or can do something.
 56
 Accordingly, my legal rights are positivistic concepts that are 
used to safeguard my receipt of those things which are owed to me according to the 
legislation of my society. 
                                                          
55
 The strategy of analysing meaning by referring to the use of a word echoes Wittgenstein, (2009), p116e. 
56
 This corresponds to the distinction between Claim and Liberty rights in legal parlance. See Hohfeld (1919). 
22 
 
   However, we also use the term „right‟ to refer to what we are owed irrespectively of what 
legal rights we may have. For instance, we still say that the citizens of totalitarian regimes 
which outlaw anti-government publications have a right to free speech, even though it is 
being infringed. Therefore, we also use the concept of a right to refer to what we are owed by 
others independently of the law, or what we might say we have a „natural‟ right to. An 
important distinction between legal rights and natural rights is that the latter seem valid 
whether or not they are actually enshrined in the law of our society, and are deemed 
inalienable. They might be thought of as the “ideal rights”
 57
 which should be (but are 
occasionally not) manifested by legal rights, owed to us not by virtue of the fact that we 
belong to a particular society, but rather because we are persons.
58
 It is this type of natural 
right which I am concerned with in this thesis, and will be what I intend to refer to when I use 
the concept of „a right‟.  
       It seems that when we ascribe a right to somebody, we are asserting that something is 
owed to the claimant of that right, whereby a failure to acknowledge that claim would 
constitute a moral wrong. Yet, even further than this, the concept of a right seems to denote 
an inviolable moral claim. A good illustration of this is the right that I am concerned with in 
this chapter, the right to life. It appears incoherent to say that someone has a right to life, but 
that it would also be permissible to kill them if it made a sufficient number of people better 
off; this just seems to misapply the concept of a right to life. In claiming that one has a right 
to life, one is claiming that the preservation of one‟s life should take precedence over other 
considerations, or at least those which are not appropriately characterised as right claims.
59
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 Hazlitt, (1964), p. 281.  
58
 I shall expand on this notion of persons bearing rights in the following sections. 
59
 One might go further and claim that one’s right to life should take precedence even over other right claims, 
(such as the right to free speech, for example). However, this point is not important to my argument, so I shall 
not consider it here. 
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   With this in mind, it seems that having the protection of a right to life is a privileged status. 
In assigning a right to life to something, we are asserting that we ought to treat that being‟s 
life as inviolable, such that the preservation of that life should take priority in our moral 
deliberations. Yet if this is so, then it seems that not every living thing qualifies for a right to 
life; for instance, few would say that preserving the life of bacteria should take priority in our 
moral deliberations. Rather, in order to qualify for a right to life, it seems that there should be 
something about that life which makes it valuable to such an extent that it should be 
considered inviolable. As such, accounts of what it means to have a right to life might 
appropriately include a set of necessary or sufficient conditions which must be met if an 
entity is to qualify for a right to life. Furthermore, it also seems that we should be able to 
justify why these conditions carry such weight. That is, there should be a reason for why 
some beings qualify for a right to life, whilst others do not. 
   Having explained what it means to have a right to life, and why it is a privileged status, in 
the next section of this chapter I shall provide reasons for prima facie doubting the claim that 
the embryo has a right to life. I shall then go on to argue in the following sections that one 
frequently espoused argument which attempts to establish this claim fails. 
 
 II 
  Several writers
60
 have argued that the concept of the embryo‟s having a right to life runs 
contrary both to our intuitions and our practices. They argue that this is clear from 
consideration of two examples. First, imagine an IVF clinic burning down with both a five 
year old child and a large number of embryos inside. Suppose further that time only permits 
rescuers to save either the child or all of the embryos. If both embryos and five year old 
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 See Ord (2008), Devolder and Harris (2007), Sandel (2005), Curzer (2004), and Harris (2003). 
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children have an equal right to life, then it would seem obligatory to save the embryos rather 
than the child (since you could save more embryos); yet this is counterintuitive.
61
 As such, it 
seems that we have the intuition that embryos do not have the same right to life as children. 
Furthermore, both natural and artificial reproduction involve the loss of many more embryos 





As such, our practices indicate that we do not treat the embryo‟s life as 
inviolable. Moreover, as Curzer argues, we do not grieve the loss of these embryos in the 
same way that we grieve being‟s which we do believe have a right to life.
 63
  
   It might be argued that none of these arguments represent a demonstrative proof 
64
 that 
embryos do not have a right to life.
65
 Treating these arguments as such would involve 
committing the naturalistic fallacy, since it would infer a normative conclusion about how we 
ought to treat embryos from a description of our intuitions and practices.
66
 However, it seems 
that they provide us with a reason to place the burden of proof upon those who argue that the 
embryo has a right to life. If such arguments are to succeed, they must be of sufficient 
strength as to overthrow our contrary intuitions and practices. As such, we might restrict the 
scope of the argument of this chapter. Since the burden of proof lies with those who wish to 
claim that the embryo has a right to life, it seems that opponents of this claim need only prove 
that the arguments which are offered in favour of the embryo bearing a right to life fail. With 
this in mind, I shall now argue that the features which are said to justify ascribing a right to 
life to the embryo are insufficient to grounding a right to life.
67
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 This example is adapted from Sandel (2004), p. 208. 
62
 See Harris (2003), Harris (2004), Devolder and Harris (2007) p. 161-162, and Ord (2008). 
63
Curzer (2004), pp. 554-558. 
64
 This is not to assume that these arguments are treated as demonstrative proofs by those who espouse 
them. 
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 See Liao (2006) and George (2002) for counterarguments. 
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 See George (2002), pp. 303-395. 
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 I shall consider only secular arguments here in order to avoid the metaphysical issues raised by appeals to 




   Proponents of the argument that the embryo has a right to life often appeal to the notion of 
human dignity. The thought underlying this appeal is that all human life is inherently 
valuable, or has an inherent „dignity‟, and that the embryo deserves protection insofar as it is 
a member of the human species.
 68
 This argument is implicit in Tangwa‟s writing. Tangwa 
claims that  
 
If any moral status can be assigned to any human being, it is by virtue of the simple fact that 




   According to Tangwa, when we ascribe moral status to a human being such that it is treated 
as having a right to life, we do this just because the subject in question is a human being. 
There is a reasonable motivation for this claim, since it calls for the equal protection of all 
human life, no matter what a particular human‟s capabilities may be. This seems to be 
important. If one ties an entity‟s moral status only to its capabilities, it might be concluded 
that infants and the mentally retarded which lack these capabilities are not worthy of the same 
protection as other humans. By tying the concept of a right to life to human dignity, one 
ensures that all humans will be afforded equal moral protection.       
   However, it is important to be clear about what is intended when one attempts to justify 
ascribing a right to life to all humans by appealing to the notion of human dignity. In the 
analysis of rights above, it was claimed that we should be able to explain why the sufficient 
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 Although one may raise doubts as to the numerical identity of the embryo and the adult that it develops into 
[see McMahan (2007), pp. 179-181], it is less problematic to claim that the embryo is a human being when 
that term is understood to mean ‘A member of the Homo Sapiens species’. 
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 Tangwa (2007) p. 453.  This thought is echoed by George (2004), p.9. 
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conditions for bearing a right to life are suitable for demarcating those beings whose lives are 
of such value that they should be considered inviolable. Accordingly, if we agree with 
Tangwa that merely „being human‟ is a sufficient condition of having a right to life, there 
must be some justification for why meeting this condition makes a life of such high value as 
to warrant the protection of a „right to life‟.  
   The appellation of the concept „human dignity‟ can mislead one as to the nature of this 
justification. The reference to a specifically „human‟ dignity can convey the impression that 
humans have an inherent dignity purely by virtue of the fact that they are members of a 
particular biological species. Yet, if the term „human‟ is understood only to demarcate a 
biological species, then claiming that humans have an inherent worth or dignity merely by 
virtue of „being human‟ is surely untenable. As Singer argues, considered in itself, the 
genotype that a being instantiates should have no bearing upon our moral appraisal of that 
being, in the same way that someone‟s ethnic origin should not affect our moral appraisal of 
them
70
; it is just morally irrelevant. Therefore, it seems that if the concept of human dignity is 
to be acceptable, it must be used to denote the thought that any human life is valuable 
because humans are a type of being which have the capacity to carry out particularly valuable 
lives.    
    Space in this chapter does not allow for a full investigation of what exactly makes human 
life particularly valuable. Some cite the fact that humans have certain rational capabilities,
71
 
whilst others might claim that the capacity to experience certain reactive attitudes such as 
                                                          
70
 Singer (following Ryder) uses the term ‘speciesist’ to refer to this thought that it is discriminatory to base a 
moral appraisal of an entity upon species membership. See Singer (1990). 
71 For instance, Singer suggests that a person is a self-conscious, rational being. Singer (1993), p. 87. For an 
alternative account, see Tooley (1972), particularly p. 44. 
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grief make human life particularly valuable.
 72
 However, whatever it is that makes human life 
particularly valuable, the important concept that this discussion highlights for my argument is 
the distinction that can be drawn between a „human being‟ and a „person‟. The term „person‟ 
is something of a quasi-legal concept, since it is also used to describe those beings which 
have legal rights. However, the concept can also be useful in discussions concerning natural 
rights, and in particular the right to life. In the context of my discussion, we might understand 
a „person‟ as a being that has certain valuable attributes
73
 which make its life particularly 
valuable. In contrast, we can understand the term „human being‟ to denote a member of the 
human species.
74
 Although some object to the use of this sort of distinction,
 75
 it might be 
argued that the status of personhood is a suitable sufficient condition of bearing a right to life; 
if a being can be described as a person, then that being has a life is of such value that it ought 
to be considered inviolable.  
    However, this distinction also raises difficult questions, since certain humans (such as 
infants and those with cognitive disabilities) may not qualify for personhood on some 
accounts.
76
 Accordingly, the distinction raises the contentious question of whether 
personhood is a necessary condition of bearing a right to life, and thereby whether some 
humans might be disqualified from bearing a right to life. A detailed analysis of this question 
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 Parfit (1984), Appendix I offers a schema for how we can describe a life having value insofar as it can ‘go 
well’. However, I am interested in the different question of which capacities can be said to make a human’s life 
valuable irrespective of whether the particular life in question has ‘gone well’. 
73
 One might also incorporate environmental factors into one’s definition of personhood. See Hughes (2001). 
74
 My argument does not require that I commit myself to a particular view about what the precise conditions 
of personhood are (which would require lengthy argument), as long as we accept the assumption that 
embryos lack any capabilities which might be claimed to demarcate personhood as the term is described here. 
I believe that this is an acceptable assumption. 
75
For instance, Sapontzis is critical of the personhood distinction, since he believes that it unduly restricts the 
number of beings which are worthy of moral consideration. (Sapontzis (1981), p. 618). I reject this claim, since 
I use the distinction only to convey the thought that certain beings deserve a higher degree of moral 
consideration than others; this does not entail that non-persons cannot enter into our moral deliberations. See 
Chapter three for discussion. Midgley’s philosophical writings can also be interpreted as being antithetical to 
the use of the personhood distinction. See Midgley (1983) and Midgley (2010). 
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See Tooley (1972). Also, as Singer argues, some non-humans might qualify for personhood on some 
definitions. See Singer (1993) pp. 110-117. 
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is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it should be acknowledged that my argument 
does not require that personhood be a necessary condition of a right to life. Since the burden 
of proof lies with those who wish to claim that the embryo has a right to life, the task of this 
chapter is only to show that the sufficiency conditions appealed to by those who wish to 
establish the embryo‟s right to life are unsuitable; it need not argue that embryos cannot have 




   As such, when it is claimed that all humans, including embryos, deserve a right to life, this 
cannot be justified by the claim that all humans are persons, since this may not be the case. 
For example, it is difficult to see how the embryo could qualify for the status of personhood 
under any reasonable definition; it lacks any sort of capacity which could confer value upon 
its current state.  Rather, the claim that all humans, including embryos, deserve a right to life 
can only be justified by the following two claims; first, that a human being is a type of being 
which typically has the capacity for personhood, and second, that this capacity is sufficient 
for bearing a right to life. Crucially, this argument does not claim that the life of an embryo is 
particularly valuable because it is a human being qua belonging to a particular biological 
species. Rather, it argues that the life of an embryo is valuable because it is a human being 
qua having the capacity for personhood; that is, a human embryo has the capacity to attain 
certain capabilities which confer a high value upon a life.  
   Therefore, the pertinent question when we consider the embryo‟s putative right to life is 
whether the embryo‟s status as a merely potential person is sufficient to grounding a right to 
life. In the final section of this chapter, I shall analyse the argument that the embryo deserves 
the protection afforded by a right to life by virtue of the fact that it is a potential person, and 
conclude that this potentiality is insufficient to grounding a right to life.  
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    It is often claimed that arguments which attempt to establish the embryo‟s right to life by 
appealing to its potential commit a logical error. This is apparent if the argument from 
potential is formulated as follows: 
 
P1 – A sufficient condition of having a right to life is having capacity x 
P2 – An embryo has the potential to acquire capacity x 
C – The embryo has a right to life 
 
The above argument is a non sequitur, since an embryo‟s having the potential to acquire a 




   However, the above formulation of the argument is uncharitable. This formulation makes it 
appear that potentiality arguments are based on the thought that the embryo has the potential 
to become something of value (i.e. something with capacity x). However, as I suggested in 
the previous section of this chapter, a more sophisticated version of the argument could claim 
that the embryo is valuable because it has potential.
79
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1) The embryo has the potential to become a morally valuable being.  
2) The embryo is a morally valuable being because it has potential 
 
According to (1), the embryo qua embryo is not valuable, whilst according to (2) it is. If one 
values the embryo‟s potentiality in accordance with (2), it is possible to formulate an 
argument for the embryo‟s right to life from potential, which is valid: 
 
P1* A sufficient condition for bearing a right to life is having the potential to become a 
person. 
P2* The embryo has the potential to become a person. 
C* The embryo has a right to life. 
 
If P1* and P2* are sound, then it may be possible to describe the embryo as having a right to 
life, by virtue of its potential. For present purposes, let us assume that P2* is true.
80
 In the 
next section, I shall demonstrate that the above argument fails because P1* is false. 
    Something similar to P1* is advocated by George.
81
 George argues that members of the 
human species are defined by their “basic natural capacities for characteristically human 
mental functions”
82
; that is to say, all humans share in the fact that they have the “internal 
resources”
83
, or (as George himself says) “the potential”
84
 to develop immediately exercisable 
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 A similar assumption will be considered in chapter four. 
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 See George (2002). 
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 Ibid, p. 298. 
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 Ibid, p. 298. 
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capacities for those things which make human life particularly valuable. Similarly, it might 
be argued that what provides the grounds for granting any human the right to life is that all 
humans have the basic natural capacity for characteristically human mental functions. If this 
is the case, then it seems that P1* may be sound. 
   However, George‟s theory is flawed because we do not describe all humans as bearing a 
right to life on the basis of their having basic natural capacities. As Strong points out, by 
George‟s own lights, having a basic natural capacity means having the potential to develop 
an immediately exercisable capacity.
85
 Yet, as we saw with the logically invalid argument 
considered earlier, having the potential for x implies that one is not x. Accordingly, as Strong 
argues, adult humans do not have the basic natural capacity (i.e. the potential) for 
characteristically human mental functions; rather they have actual capacities, and we afford 
them rights by virtue of these fully actualised immediately exercisable capacities.
86
 As such, 
Strong argues that there is no reason to suppose that the embryo‟s possession of a basic 
natural capacity is sufficient grounding for a right to life. 
   A possible rejoinder to Strong‟s argument could be that it just misses the point of George‟s 
argument, because the fact that an adult human‟s potential has been actualised should be 
morally irrelevant. The thought here would be that having an immediately exercisable 
capacity is just to have a developed type of basic natural capacity, and that the state of 
development is morally irrelevant. If this were correct, then contra Strong, we could ascribe a 
right to life to all humans on the basis of their possessing basic natural capacities, even if they 
are at different developmental stages.  
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   However, this is a weak response. Even if we accept that every human can be described as 
being at some stage along a descriptive continuum of bearing a basic natural capacity to some 
degree
87
, it still seems appropriate to mark out points of discontinuity in how we value beings 
along this descriptive continuum. It seems that one morally relevant stage at which to mark a 
value discontinuity is the stage of the descriptive continuity at which the being in question 
develops immediately exercisable capacities. After all, it is only after this stage of 




   The point is that when we assign a right to life to a being by virtue of its capabilities, what 
we seem to mean
89
 by this is that it is the possession of those capabilities which makes the 
subject‟s life particularly valuable. As such, even if we say that having an immediately 
exercisable capacity is just to have a developed basic natural capacity, we can still say that 
the stage of the continuity at which a human attains an immediately exercisable capacity 
marks a point of discontinuity in how we value different human beings. Only after humans 
reach this stage do we actually mean that they have lives of a sufficient value to warrant the 
protection of a right to life. Therefore, even though the embryo might have the potential to 
develop these immediately exercisable capacities, this mere potential does not confer a 
sufficient value to the embryo qua embryo for assigning a right to life. 
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 Brown (2007) provides arguments for why we should not even do this, by claiming that first order potential 
is intransitive. I shall not consider this argument here, since I believe that the argument I offer is sufficient to 
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   A likely objection to this conclusion is that it seems to preclude the possibility of many 
other human non-persons, such as infants and coma patients having rights. As I mentioned 
above, this is a serious problem facing the use of the personhood distinction. However, this 
objection is misplaced in this context for two reasons. First, my argument does not claim that 
the possession of these capabilities is a necessary condition of bearing a right to life
90
; as 
such my view does not preclude ascribing rights to these non-persons if they meet some other 
sufficient condition for right bearing. For example, we might appeal to the agential history of 
the coma patient, or the infant‟s relationship with its parents to ground a right in these cases.
91
 
Although I cannot defend the view here, I suggest that the reasons we might give in order to 
justify the ascription of rights to coma patients and infants would not be applicable to the 
embryo.  
   Furthermore, this objection also assumes that the fact that these humans fail to qualify for 
right bearing status on this theory is an unacceptable conclusion. However, this need not be 
the case; as I shall argue in the next chapter, this thought seems to be based upon an 
inadequately narrow view of how it is possible to take things into moral consideration. 
Although right bearing affords a high degree of moral protection, it is still possible to regard 
a being as deserving moral consideration, even if it may be inappropriate to describe that 
being as bearing a right. As such, this objection does not present an insurmountable challenge 
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   Therefore, attempts to establish that the embryo has a right to life by virtue of its potential 
fail. The reason for this is that „having the potential to become a person‟ is unsuitable as a 
sufficiency condition for bearing a right to life; in contrast, I have argued that the status of 
actualised (and not merely potential) personhood is a suitable sufficient condition. The scope 
of this conclusion is limited in two ways; first, it has not been established that the embryo 
could not meet some alternative sufficient conditions of bearing a right to life. However, 
given the intuitive support of the claim that the embryo does not have a right to life, the 
burden of proof lies with those who wish to prove that the embryo could meet some other 
sufficient conditions for right bearing. This is a considerable task, since it is not clear if there 
is anything about the embryo, other than its potential for personhood, that could qualify it as 
having a life of such value that we ought to consider it as inviolable.
 92
  
    Second, one may argue that although the embryo does not have a right to life, it may yet 
deserve some degree of moral protection. This must be admitted, and will be considered in 
the following two chapters.  However, to conclude this chapter, I have established that the 
embryo does not have a life which is of such value that it should be considered inviolable, as 
is the case when we claim that a being has a right to life. Therefore, the first assumption 
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   The second assumption underlying the compromise position that I shall consider over the 
next two chapters is that we can make sense of there being moral constraints upon the way in 
which we treat embryos, without ascribing rights to them. Since I have claimed that the 
embryo does not have a right to life, it seems that proponents of the compromise position 
must make this assumption if they are to explain why therapeutic cloning is morally wrong 
because of the way in which it treats embryos.  
   In contrast, some writers seem to imply that the only moral consideration at work in the 
area of hESC research ethics is the question of whether the embryo has a right to life is. For 
instance, Curzer states: 
 
Creating embryos solely for the sake of harvesting stem cells from them turns out to be 




   However, this oversimplifies
95
 the various ways in which one can regard something as 
deserving moral consideration. Indeed, according to the framework indicated in Curzer‟s 
quote above, there is no room for claiming that therapeutic cloning is morally wrong if one 
claims that the embryo does not have a right to life. In order to reject this framework, I shall 
begin my defence of the second premise underlying the compromise position by arguing that 
                                                          
94
 Curzer (2004), p. 558. 
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it can be disadvantageous to frame our discussion of moral issues solely using the language 
of rights, since doing so does not allow us to incorporate an important set of moral 
considerations in our discourse. I shall then argue that the moral considerations that the 
language of rights does not capture can be articulated in a language of respect. In the next 
chapter, I shall then use this model of respect to defend the second assumption underlying the 
compromise position, namely that we can make sense of placing moral constraints on our 
treatment of embryos without claiming that they have rights. 
   To outline briefly the strategy of this chapter, in the first section I shall recap, and elaborate 
upon the characterisation of rights given in chapter two, before identifying two inadequacies 
of using this language alone to frame some moral situations in the second section. In the third 
section, I shall then offer an account of „the language of respect‟, before arguing in the final 
section that the moral considerations which the language of rights fails to incorporate can be 
articulated in the language of respect. 
 
I. 
    In the first section of chapter two, I provided an account of what it means to ascribe a right 
to life to something. To recap, in assigning a right to life to something, we are asserting that 
we ought to treat that being‟s life as inviolable, such that the preservation of that life should 
take priority in our moral deliberations. As such, this right claim is an inviolable moral claim; 
it sets particularly stringent obligations upon others to act in certain ways in accordance with 
that right. Ceteris paribus, if one fails to act in accordance with these obligations, then one 
has committed a serious moral wrong. 
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    This can be contrasted with claims that do not amount to rights. For example, I might 
believe that I have a claim to skip a hospital queue if my injuries are more severe than those 
of others in the queue. However, it seems incorrect to suppose that I have a right to skip the 
queue in this case, such that my claim should take precedence over the interests of others in 
the queue. That is, in saying that I have a claim to skip the queue, I am not arguing that the 
members of the queue are obliged to let me pass by some right I have; rather I am claiming 
that they should give due consideration to the fact that I am in pain, and let me pass. A key 
difference here is that it does not seem that they have wronged me if they refuse; in contrast, 
we use the concept of „right‟ to signify an inviolable moral claim, such that one wrongs a 
claimant if one fails to act in accordance with their rights. It seems that the reason for this is 
that the purpose of assigning rights is to safeguard those things that we believe should take 
priority in our moral deliberations. 
    According to the above analysis, in asserting that one has a right to x, one is making a 
moral claim that x is owed to one, and that preventing our having x is morally wrong.
96
 A 
salient feature of „the language of rights‟ then seems to be that it describes situations in terms 
of inviolable moral claims. This is not intended to be a comprehensive analysis of rights 
language.
97
 However, by having elucidated this salient feature of the language of rights, it is 
possible to point out two of its inadequacies. 
    The first inadequacy of the language of rights is that it cannot incorporate the moral claims 
which do not amount to right claims. That we have such moral claims is suggested by 
examples in which someone has been wronged, but the application of the language of rights 
seems inappropriate. For example, consider the language we use to describe the claims 
involved in promise making. Suppose that Mark has promised Frank to meet him for dinner, 
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but decides not to turn up. Intuitively, we believe that Mark has wronged Frank here. 
However, it does not seem plausible to cash this wrong out in the language of rights. 
Although we might wish to say that Mark‟s promise gives Frank a moral claim to Mark‟s 
presence at dinner, this claim does not seem to be inviolable in the same way that we 
understand a right to be. Unlike a right, Frank‟s claim could plausibly be overridden by a 
non-right claim; for example, suppose that Mark‟s wife were in labour; in this case it seems 
that Mark would have a moral claim to attend to her that is sufficient to morally justify 
breaking his promise to Frank. As such, it does not seem appropriate to characterise the moral 
claims involved in promise-making as right claims.  
   However, even though they do not amount to rights, it can still be wrong to violate these 
claims. Since Mark has no reason for failing to turn up to the dinner arrangement, and a 
fortiori has no competing moral claims to weigh against his promise to Frank, we can say that 
Mark‟s failure to acknowledge Frank‟s moral claim qualifies as a moral wrong, even though 
it does not violate a right. The wrong arises from the fact that Mark fails to properly 
acknowledge that Frank has a moral claim against him (by virtue of his promise) in his 
deliberation about what to do. The two main points in this example are that it is possible to 
have a moral claim that does not amount to a right, and that failing to acknowledge such a 
claim in one‟s deliberations wrongs the claimant. Examples that involve such violations show 
that we can wrong someone without violating a right. As such, if we frame moral situations 
only in the language of rights, it is not clear how we can incorporate this important set of 
moral claims in our discourse. 
   The second inadequacy of the language of rights is that it fails to explain the moral 
considerations that we can owe towards non right-bearing entities. It seems that in order to 
make sense of something having either a right or even just a moral claim upon us, that entity 
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must have at least the conceptual
98
 capacity to make a claim upon us.
99
 For example, it would 
be peculiar to assert that a forest had either a right or a claim to protection, even if we agree 
that we are obliged to protect them in some ways. Similarly, one might argue that some 
animals fail to meet certain necessary requirements of right-bearing, given their lower 
capacities.
100
 The second inadequacy of rights language, and even of the more general 
language of moral claims, is that neither can account for the moral considerations that we can 
have for these entities. The general problem with the language of rights here is that right-
bearing is a binary concept; an entity either does or does not have a certain right, and the 
moral protection that goes with it. As such, the language of rights is ill-equipped to deal with 
the intermediate position in which we can include beings in our moral considerations, even if 
they cannot appropriately be described as bearing a right. 
   In response, one might deny that we can have moral considerations for non right-bearing 
entities. However, this is an unappealing position; to assert that the whole idea of moral 
consideration is dependent upon the conceptual framework of rights just seems to beg the 
question, given the argument that this chapter is making. A marginally stronger reply would 
be that we should ascribe rights of different strength to different beings. For example, one 
might believe that animals do not qualify for the inviolable rights of a human, yet argue that 
they qualify for weaker rights in accordance with their weaker capabilities. Haworth proposes 
a theory of animal rights in this vein,
101
 whereby animals have a right to life, but this weak 
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right can be outweighed by the interests of a human.
 102
 In a similar vein, it might be argued 
that we should regard the claims in the promise-making example as weak types of rights 
which can be overridden by other considerations. In this way, contrary to my argument, the 
language of rights might yet be able to accommodate all of our moral considerations. 
    However, this is an unsatisfactory response. The fundamental weakness in this reply is that 
using the term „right‟ to refer to the moral claims or considerations in these cases seems to 
differ in kind to the way we use the concept of a right. As we saw in the previous analysis, we 
use the concept of a right to denote inviolable moral claims, and we deem these claims to be 
inviolable because their purpose is to safeguard those things which we believe should take 
priority in our moral deliberations. However, in both the promise-making example and 
Haworth‟s animal rights theory, what are purported to be „rights‟ can be overridden by other 
moral considerations which do not amount to rights. For example, Haworth explicitly states 
that animal rights can be overridden in favour of mere human interests.
103 
  
   Therefore, to use the term „right‟ to refer even to these sorts of weak claims, is to dilute the 
prescriptive force which sets the concept of a right apart from other types of moral claim in 
the first place. As such, extending the term „right‟ to these contexts misapplies the concept. 
Even if we assume that Haworth‟s position that animals can make moral claims upon us is 
tenable (and one need not), it does not seem suitable to be classed as a theory of rights, since 
the claims of these animals are not inviolable. Rather, it would be far more appropriate to 
characterise Haworth‟s position as arguing that non-human animals have moral claims that do 
not amount to rights (like in the promise-making example). To argue instead that these sort of 
weak moral claims should be termed rights, is as Lomasky claims, “disruptive and 
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”; doing so distorts our understanding of the prescriptive force of the claims at 
work in these situations. 
    To conclude this section, there are two important inadequacies concerning the language of 
rights. First, it cannot incorporate the moral considerations that we articulate in moral claims 
which do not amount to rights claims, and second, it cannot account for how we can have 
moral considerations for non right-bearing entities. Furthermore, attempts to extend the 
language of rights to these cases misapply the concept of a right, since in these cases we can 
prioritise the non - right claims of others over the so called „rights‟ claims of the subjects 
involved without wronging them. In the next section of this chapter, I shall explain how we 
might frame our discussion of moral situations in a language of respect, before arguing that 




   Respect is a multivalent concept, and requires delimitation if it is to be used in a solely 
moral context. The first distinction we can draw is between what Darwall calls “appraisal 
respect” and “recognition respect”.
105
 „Appraisal respect‟ is the positive appraisal we make of 
some person by virtue of his excellence in either some characteristic or practice. For example, 
I might say that “I respect Churchill‟s rhetorical skill.” This is to be contrasted with 
„recognition respect‟, in which the respect consists of the disposition to weigh in one‟s 
deliberations some feature about the respected.
106
 For example, this is the respect that one 
might have for a judge. Only in the case of recognition respect does the respect due to the 
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respected also include the prescription of some sort of behaviour.
107
 It is this latter 
„recognition‟ respect that is pertinent to my discussion. 
   It is also important to delimit the concept of recognition respect to the moral domain. When 
we pay „recognition respect‟ to something, the object of our respect is not the entity as such, 
but rather some feature of the entity.
108
 For example, in paying respect to a judge, we respect 
that the person in question bears a certain office, and we pay respect by setting appropriate 
constraints on our behaviour towards him or her. With this in mind, it seems possible to have 
a specific concept of „moral respect‟, in which the respect we afford is a recognition of some 
morally relevant aspect of the respected. To illustrate, compare the following: We might say 
that we respect the Queen of England because she is the head of the monarchy. However, the 
respect afforded in this case is clearly different from affording respect to the dead; in the 
latter case, but not the former, a failure to constrain our behaviour in a manner which conveys 
the proper respect seems to be a specifically moral failing, rather than a mere failing of 
etiquette. 
      This raises the question of how one expresses proper moral respect. It seems that the 
expression of the moral respect due to an entity involves setting moral constraints upon the 
way we treat it. However, it is difficult to define the respect that it is appropriate to afford to 
beings in general terms, because the proper respect due to a particular being seems to depend 
on the nature of that being. For example, it seems that expressing proper moral respect to an 
animal would involve setting different constraints upon our behaviour than expressing proper 
respect to a deceased human.  
   One reasonable guideline that might be suggested here is that expressing proper respect to 
an entity involves setting constraints upon our action that honour or safeguard whatever it is 
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that is judged to be morally relevant about the entity in question.
109
 For example, the respect 
afforded to animals can be described as proper if it involves constraining one‟s behaviour in a 
manner that addresses the morally relevant aspect that the animal is sentient.
110
 However, 
since this aspect is not applicable to the dead, we need not constrain our behaviour towards 
the dead in the same manner. In this way, we can say that respect is a gradable concept, since 
different degrees of constraints are appropriate to different morally relevant aspects.
111
 
   Therefore, as well as framing moral questions in the language of rights, it is also possible to 
frame moral situations in a language of respect. When we claim that something is worthy of 
moral respect in a given situation, we are stating that there is a morally relevant aspect 
concerning that thing, or the context of which that thing is part, which ought to bear weight in 
our moral deliberations. In acknowledgement of this, we can afford it proper respect by 
constraining our behaviour in a manner that takes into account those morally relevant aspects. 
In the last section of this chapter, I shall argue that framing moral situations in the language 
of respect allows one to avoid the inadequacies of using the language of rights outlined in the 




   Recall that the first inadequacy of the language of rights is that it cannot account for moral 
claims that do not amount to right claims. It seems that the language of respect can explain 
why such claims have force in our moral deliberations. For instance, we can frame the 
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promise-making example considered earlier in a way that explains why Mark‟s act is wrong 
using the language of respect. It seems that the morally relevant aspect in this example is that 
Mark has promised to meet Frank at a certain time. For Mark to respect this is for him to give 
it weight in his deliberations, and to constrain his behaviour accordingly; therefore, in failing 
to attend dinner without good reason, Mark fails to constrain his behaviour in a manner that is 
appropriate to a morally relevant aspect of the situation (i.e. that he has promised to attend 
dinner). The wrongness of acts which ignore non-right claims can be explained by the fact 
that they manifest a lack of appropriate respect for a morally relevant aspect of a subject or 
the context of which that subject is part.  
   The second inadequacy of the language of rights is that it cannot account for the moral 
considerations we may have for non right-bearing entities. Again, this is not problematic in 
the language of respect, since this language can accommodate the thought that different 
morally relevant aspects can make different grades of respect appropriate. We might say that 
some morally relevant aspects (such as rational capability) make it appropriate to respect 
entities to an extent that calls for treatment which is equivalent to assigning a right to life.
112
 
Yet other morally relevant aspects, such as an entity‟s sentience, might make it appropriate to 
respect them to an extent that may not be equivalent to assigning rights to them, but affords 
them some lesser degree of moral protection.
113
 The difference from the language of rights 
here is that the language of respect can accommodate the thought that something can have 
moral relevance even if it is insufficient grounding for a right claim. 
   As such, the language of respect has a significant advantage over the language of rights 
here. In the language of rights, if a being fails to meet a sufficient condition for bearing 
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rights, then it is difficult to make sense of how it is still worthy of moral consideration. In 
contrast, in the language of respect, if a being lacks a morally relevant attribute that makes 
„full moral respect‟ appropriate, it may still have another morally relevant attribute that 
makes it appropriate to constrain our behaviour in some ways in order to afford proper moral 
respect. Furthermore, although it seems unusual to talk about non-agents such as forests 
either having or making claims, it seems coherent to talk of respecting them by virtue of 
certain morally relevant aspects about them. 
   Therefore, it is now possible to understand how framing all the moral issues associated with 
hESC research in the language of rights is disadvantageous. Recall that Curzer claimed that 
the moral permissibility of creating embryos for research turns solely on the issue of whether 
the embryo has a right to life. Describing this issue solely in the language of rights is 
disadvantageous, since it cannot account for the position of those who deny that embryos 
have a right to life, yet still believe that it is appropriate to set some moral constraints upon 
our treatment of them. Whether or not this position is ultimately tenable, it still seems that the 
language that we use to frame the issue should at least be able to conceptually allow for such 
a position. 
    To conclude this chapter, the language of respect allows us to frame moral situations in a 
way that incorporates the moral considerations that are not captured by the language of rights. 
This chapter has argued that we should also use the language of respect to frame our 
discussion of moral issues, in order to highlight moral considerations other than right claims 
in our deliberations. One example of a moral issue which could be described more clearly 
using the language of respect is the issue of whether it is morally permissible to create an 
embryo for the sole purpose of destroying it in research. Although we may concede that it is 
morally permissible to destroy embryos insofar as they do not have a right to life, we may yet 
be able to make sense of placing moral constraints upon our treatment of embryos which 
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preclude the moral permissibility of creating them for research purposes, if there is some 
morally relevant aspect of the embryo, (or context in which the embryo is to be considered) 

















   To take stock, my investigation of the compromise position to this point has led to the 
conclusions that the embryo does not have a right to life, and that framing some moral issues 
in the language of respect allows for a more nuanced understanding than the language of 
rights can provide. In this chapter, I shall complete the defence of the second assumption 
underlying the compromise position, namely that we can make sense of there being moral 
constraints on the way in which we treat embryos, without ascribing rights to them. To do so, 
I shall argue that proponents of the compromise position can coherently view the embryo as 
deserving moral respect by virtue of its potential to become a person. As such, they might 
claim that we ought to place moral constraints on our treatment of embryos in order to afford 
them proper moral respect. 
   My strategy in this chapter shall be as follows. In the first section, I shall explain precisely 
what I hope to claim in this chapter, and pre-emptively dispel some possible preliminary 
concerns about the line of argument being made. In the second section, I shall then explain 
why it is coherent to view the embryo‟s potential as being relevant to the way in which we 
morally value it. In the third section, I shall argue that the in vitro embryo has a degree of 
potential which is of sufficient significance to warrant affording it moral respect. In the final 
section, I shall then explain how the model of respect outlined provides proponents of the 
compromise position with a response to three alternative views of potential, before explaining 






I   
   First, it is important to be clear about what I shall claim in this chapter. The first thing to 
make clear is that this chapter is considering the argument that all embryos deserve moral 
respect by virtue of their potential. It is possible to claim that only embryos which are part of 
a parental project deserve moral protection.
114
 However, although proponents of the 
compromise position may concede that embryos which are part of a parental project may 
warrant more protection than unwanted embryos, they must make the further claim that 
SCNT embryos, which are not part of a parental project, also deserve moral protection if they 
are to claim that therapeutic cloning is morally impermissible.
115
 
    Furthermore, since this thesis is only investigating whether the compromise position is 
tenable, this chapter will consider only whether viewing the embryo as deserving moral 
respect by virtue of its potential is coherent; it will not argue that we ought to view the 
embryo as deserving moral respect, in the sense that failing to do so would be an error. This 
is an important point to acknowledge, since the claim that it is coherent to view something as 
deserving moral respect is a far more modest claim than the claim that we ought to view 
something as deserving moral respect. For instance, making the latter claim seems to require 
making the contentious meta-ethical assumption that questions concerning the desert of moral 
respect are an objective matter, such that we can make sense of the idea that it would be an 
error not to believe that something deserved moral respect.  
   As such, in order to avoid what would be a lengthy consideration of this assumption, I shall 
argue only that it is coherent to regard the embryo‟s potential as morally relevant. Therefore, 
I must concede that my argument is somewhat limited; it will not convince those who do not 
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regard the embryo‟s potential as morally relevant that they ought to do so, or that they are 
somehow in error.  
   However, showing that it can be coherent to view the embryo as deserving moral respect by 
virtue of its potential will still be a significant conclusion, since the debate concerning the 
moral significance of potential seems to have reached a stalemate founded in disagreements 
concerning the coherence of this view. Although this is to somewhat caricature the debate, it 
seems that liberal opponents of the potential argument reject the idea of placing moral 
constraints on our treatment of embryos by virtue of their potential, because they find it 
incoherent to value embryos for capacities that they don‟t currently have.
116
 In contrast, 
supporters of the argument from potential just seem to assume that the embryo‟s having the 
potential for valuable capacities makes it coherent to value it in its current state.
117
 
Accordingly, as well as establishing the soundness of the second assumption underlying the 
compromise position, my argument in this chapter may also indicate a way out of this 
stalemate, by explaining how we may understand the way in which proponents of the 
compromise position value the embryo as a coherent view, even if we do not find it 
appealing.  
   Before analysing this view, it is prudent to respond to two possible preliminary concerns 
with the very notion of valuing the embryo. First, as was explained in chapter two, some of 
our intuitions and practices seem to indicate that we do not believe that the life of the embryo 
is inviolable.
118
 Moreover, the fact that we do not grieve these embryos when they are either 
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destroyed or fail to come to term suggests that we do not value these embryos in a way that 
would warrant the placing of moral constraints on the ways in which we treat them.
119
  
   However, these arguments fail to demonstrate that we do not value unwanted embryos in 
any way. The first point to acknowledge here is that even if we do not treat the embryo‟s life 
as inviolable, this does not entail that we cannot place any moral constraints on our treatment 
of them; as I argued in the previous chapter, it is possible to regard something as worthy of 
moral consideration, without claiming that it is inviolable.  
   Furthermore, the fact that we do not grieve embryos which have been destroyed or lost does 
not entail that we cannot coherently place any moral constraints upon how we treat embryos. 
The misuse of body parts is analogous to this case. Although it seems correct to say that a 
patient would not grieve the loss of a kidney which had to be removed in order to save his 
life, it still seems that there are some moral constraints upon what can be done with that 
kidney. For instance, it should not be used for medical research or teaching without the 
patient‟s consent.
120
 In the same way, the fact that we do not display a reactive attitude to the 
loss of an embryo does not entail that we can use them in any way we wish. To illustrate, it 
seems that destroying a large number of embryos for some trivial purpose such as developing 
a new line of decorative
121
 cosmetics would at least be morally questionable. As such, even if 
we do not grieve the loss of embryos, this fact does not demonstrate that we cannot 
consistently value them to an extent that calls for placing some moral constraints on how we 
treat them. 
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      Second, it is also prudent to address how it can be coherent to view the embryo‟s 
potential as being sufficient to warranting the claim that the embryo deserves moral respect, 
but not the claim that the embryo has a right to life (in light of the argument I made in chapter 
two).
 
To recap, in chapter two I argued that having a right to life denotes that the bearer of 
that right has a life of such value that it ought to be considered inviolable.
122
 However, in 
chapter three I argued that we can also make sense of there being moral constraints upon how 
we ought to treat certain things, even if we do not consider them to be inviolable; I argued 
that the way in which we can articulate these moral constraints is to claim that we can owe 
these things moral respect. Accordingly, it is consistent to claim that some feature may be 
sufficient to grounding moral respect, but not a right claim. 
   However, the case of potential may seem problematic, since the argument for ascribing a 
right to life to embryos by virtue of their potential was found to be flawed.
123
 As such, it is 
necessary to show that the flaw in the argument from potential only pertains when the 
argument is used in an attempt to establish the embryo‟s right to life, and not as a basis for 
affording moral respect. The flaw with attributing a right to life to the embryo by virtue of its 
potential was that mere potential to develop certain capabilities does not confer the same 
value upon a life as actually having those capabilities. As such, although we may wish to say 
that having certain capabilities can make a life of such value that it should be considered 
inviolable, having the mere potential for these capabilities does not also make that life 
inviolable. 
   However, this does not entail that the embryo‟s potential is of no value whatsoever; all it 
means is that having the potential to develop certain capabilities is insufficient to making a 
life of such value that it ought to be considered inviolable. Yet, affording moral respect to an 
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entity does not require that we view its life as inviolable. All that is necessary is that there is 
some morally relevant aspect of the entity in question that can justify our affording it moral 
respect. Therefore, although only the possession of fully actualised capabilities is sufficient to 
grounding a right to life, this does not commit us to the claim that the mere potential for these 
capabilities is morally irrelevant. As such, it may be legitimate for proponents of the 
compromise position to claim that the embryo‟s potential confers some value upon its life 
which is sufficient to warrant affording it moral respect, without saying that this potential 
warrants ascribing a right to life. 
 
II 
   Thus far, this chapter has responded to the negative claim that we cannot make sense of 
affording moral respect to the embryo by virtue of its potential. However, a positive argument 
for why it is coherent for proponents of the compromise position to view the embryo‟s 
potential as morally relevant is still required, if this thought is to ground the claim that the 
embryo deserves moral respect. The coherence of this view is seemingly taken for granted by 
proponents of the compromise position; presumably they believe that the moral value of 
„actualised‟ personhood somehow transmits to potential persons in some diluted sense. That 
is to say that the fact that an embryo has the potential to develop valuable capacities, makes it 
coherent to value the embryo in its current state, and to therefore claim that it deserves moral 
respect.  
   However, as I suggested above, opponents of the compromise position challenge the 
coherence of this view. In this section, I shall offer an argument in support of the coherence 
of valuing the embryo by virtue of its potential, by showing that we find it coherent to place 
moral value on other potential states. I shall claim that morally valuing personhood involves 
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valuing a form of potential, since the fundamental basis for valuing personhood is that a 
person has the potential for autonomy. As such, I shall argue that proponents of the 
compromise position can justify valuing the embryo insofar as it can be viewed as having a 
degree of potential for autonomy, albeit in a less significant sense than a person. 
   To make this argument, I must return to the argument of chapter two regarding what we 
value about human life, as well as considering some Kantian philosophy. In chapter two, I 
drew the distinction between a „human being‟ and a „person‟, whereby a „person‟ has certain 
attributes that make its life particularly valuable which a non-person does not have.
124
 
Furthermore, I argued that „personhood‟ is a suitable sufficiency condition for bearing a right 
to life. Let us consider this in a little more depth. Although we may agree that the capacities 
which demarcate personhood under a proposed definition are valuable, it is difficult to 
ascertain why we find them valuable.
125
 For example, when it is claimed that the capacity for 
self consciousness demarcates personhood, we might well ask why we should value self 
consciousness to this extent. 
    One reply to this would be that capacities such as self-consciousness are intrinsically 
valuable. However, this reply does not seem wholly correct; it seems possible to ask why self 
consciousness adds such immense value to life, in a manner which would appear incoherent 
if it were intrinsically valuable. An alternative explanation for why we find the capacities that 
demarcate personhood to be valuable is that they seem to be related in an important way to 
autonomy, or in Kantian terms the “property the will has of being a law unto itself”.
126
 For 
example, to be autonomous agents capable of freely willing our actions, it seems that we 
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must be self conscious and able to plan a future for that self. As such, it seems plausible that 
the status of personhood might be a necessary condition of having an autonomous will. I shall 
return to this thought below. 
    It also seems plausible to claim that the capacity for autonomy can confer such value upon 
a life as to render it inviolable. For Kant, the principle of autonomy, namely that one should 
act only upon maxims which are formulated by the subject in accordance with the dictates of 
practical reason, is the “sole principle of morality”.
127
 To be a moral agent in the Kantian 
sense, one must be capable of autonomously formulating the moral law through practical 
reason. Accordingly, for Kant, autonomy is the ground of the particular moral value
128
 we 
place upon human life, because only an autonomous being can qualify as a member of the 
moral community, insofar as he is able to formulate the universal moral law.
129
 
      Similarly, when we ascribe a right to life to a person, it seems plausible to understand the 
fundamental basis for doing so as being to safeguard that person‟s capacity for autonomy, 
since autonomy seems to be a plausible candidate for being that aspect which makes life 
particularly valuable. However, it is important to be precise about the relationship between 
personhood and autonomy. Consider this example: Suppose that a husband continuously 
beats his wife, who becomes so used to these beatings that she develops a desire to be beaten 
for any error. Suppose further that she qualifies for personhood. If one were to morally 
challenge the husband‟s actions here, it seems that he could reply that he is not violating his 
wife‟s rights or the moral respect she is due, because she chooses to receive these beatings.    
   The obvious counter to the husband‟s defence here is that he is doing something morally 
wrong because his wife is not reasoning autonomously. Her choice is dictated by the 
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influence of unwilled desires that have been formed by her persistent subjection to these 
beatings. To phrase this in Kantian terms, her choice is heteronomous because her will “does 
not give itself the law; rather the object (of her will) gives the law to it”.
130
  In contrast, to be 
autonomous is to make rational decisions of one‟s own making, independent from the 
influence of one‟s desires. 
   This example reveals something important about the relationship between personhood and 
autonomy. Clearly we want to say that the wife is an appropriate subject of moral concern. 
However, in this case autonomy, the fundamental basis for valuing personhood, is not 
achieved by the wife. Therefore, what this example suggests is that although personhood 
confers value to a life because of its relation to autonomy, it is not the case that persons are 
always autonomous. As such, it seems that the reason that we value personhood is not 
because being a person is sufficient for being autonomous; rather, as I suggested above, it 
seems that personhood is only a necessary condition for autonomy.
131
 Accordingly, when we 
ascribe a right to life on the basis of personhood, we are not doing so because to be a person 
is to be autonomous. Rather, personhood entails that the subject in question has the potential 
to be autonomous in a way that non-persons do not. Yet this is still only the potential for 
autonomy, not actual autonomy.   
   This might be misinterpreted as contradicting an argument from chapter two. In chapter 
two, I argued that the embryo‟s potential is insufficient to grounding a right to life, because 
only actual personhood can confer such value upon a life that it should be considered 
inviolable.
132
 This might seem to conflict with the claim that I am advancing here, namely 
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that the status of personhood means only that the subject in question has the potential for 
autonomy, that aspect which fundamentally makes a life particularly valuable.  
   However, this claim does not conflict with anything that has already been argued. Recall 
that it was claimed that we only ascribe a right to life to something which has a life of such 
value that we consider it to be inviolable. Even if personhood is not sufficient for autonomy, 
we can still say that personhood can make a life inviolable because it is a necessary condition 
of autonomy. Therefore, even a person who is not autonomous at a certain time still has a 
more valuable life than a non-person, just because they have certain capacities without which 
it is impossible to be autonomous; accordingly, it is open for one to argue that persons have a 
right to life even if they are not always autonomous. On the other hand, non-persons do not 
have a right to life because they do not have the capacities which are necessary for autonomy.  
   Therefore, when we talk about valuing life, the presumption that this value is based on 
actual capabilities does not tell the whole story.
133
 Although only the actual possession of the 
capabilities which demarcate personhood is sufficient for bearing a right to life, personhood 
is not sufficient for that aspect which makes life particularly valuable, autonomy. Since it is 
possible for a person to act heteronomously, it seems that the reason that we value actually 
having the capabilities that demarcate personhood is that they are a necessary condition of 
autonomy. As such, persons are only appropriate subjects of moral concern insofar as they 
could be autonomous in a particularly significant sense.     
    With this in mind, it seems that it can also be coherent for proponents of the compromise 
position to regard the embryo‟s potential as morally relevant. In placing moral value on 
personhood, I have argued that we are placing moral value on a being‟s potential for 
autonomy. Therefore, although non persons (such as embryos) do not have the capacities 
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which are necessary for autonomy, having a degree of potential for personhood means that 
we can make sense of non-persons deserving moral consideration (albeit to a lesser extent 
than a person), even if they aren‟t members of the moral community in the Kantian sense.  
We can do so because, just as we value persons insofar as they have the potential for 
autonomy, so too can we value non-persons if we can understand them as having a degree of 
potential for autonomy, insofar as they have the potential for personhood.  
   With this in mind, it seems that there is some truth in George‟s argument considered in 
chapter two, concerning the embryo‟s possession of basic natural capacities for human 
mental functions.
134
 Although I argued that George‟s argument was flawed in claiming that 
the possession of these basic natural capacities is sufficient for ascribing a right to life to the 
embryo, the argument that I have proposed in this section suggests that it is plausible to claim 
that the possession of these basic natural capacities can confer moral value upon the embryo. 
The reason for this is that we can make sense of beings which possess these basic natural 
capacities as having a degree of potential for autonomy, albeit to a less significant extent than 
persons. 
   Therefore, it can be coherent to view the embryo as deserving moral respect by virtue of its 
potential. Just as it is coherent to value persons insofar as they have a significant degree of 
potential for autonomy, so too can we view embryos as deserving moral consideration if they 
have a significant degree of potential to become persons. Accordingly, the next step in 
defending the second premise is to argue that the in vitro embryo has a degree of potential for 
personhood which is sufficient to qualify it as an appropriate subject of moral respect. 
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    It seems that an embryo must be a potential person in some sense, since all human persons 
developed from an embryonic state. However, it is a matter of controversy whether in vitro 
embryos have a degree of potential which is of sufficient significance to be morally relevant. 
In the case of in utero embryos, the embryo has (to use an Aristotelian term) „active 
potential‟, because its development is determined by internal factors; as George puts it, it has 
the “epigenetic primordia for self directed growth.”
135
 Barring external interference or 
spontaneous abortions, implanted embryos will normally develop to term. In contrast, in vitro 
embryos must be placed into a particular sustaining environment (i.e. a womb) in order to 
develop into infants. As such, these embryos are dependent upon at least one external factor 
for their development. Consequently, in vitro embryos have only „passive potentiality‟ whilst 
in utero embryos have active potentiality.
136
 
   This might not seem problematic; one might claim that even the possession of passive 
potentiality is morally significant. However, this thought is thrown into doubt when one 
considers other things that have passive potential to develop into persons. For example, a pair 
of gametes has the passive potential to develop into a person, since if certain things are 
brought about by external forces, namely syngamy followed by implantation, this pair of 
gametes may develop into a fully developed person (barring the interferences mentioned with 
reference to implanted embryos previously). Furthermore, it may technically be possible to 
produce an embryo from a single egg cell through the process of induced parthenogenesis,
137
 
or from a somatic cell via the process of Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer.
138
 The fact that these 
cells have the passive potential to develop into persons arguably represents a reductio ad 
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absurdum of the argument that we should afford in vitro embryos moral respect on the basis 




   Therefore, if proponents of the compromise position are to claim that the in vitro embryo 
deserves moral respect by virtue of its potential, it must be demonstrated that its passive 
potential has greater significance than the potential of the types of cells mentioned above. 
Singer and Dawson argue that such an argument cannot be made.
140
 For Singer and Dawson 
there are two senses of potential: On the one hand, we can talk about something having the 
potential to become x insofar as it is possible for that thing to become x. On the other hand, 
we can talk about something having the potential to become x insofar as it is probable that it 
will become x. For Singer and Dawson, one cannot distinguish the in vitro embryo‟s potential 
from the potential of gamete pairs or somatic cells in either of these senses.  
   In the first case, it is just as possible for gamete pairs and somatic cells to develop into 
human beings as it is for an in vitro embryo, since they all contain sufficient genetic material 
to create a new life. Furthermore, gamete pairs and in vitro embryos do not have a markedly 
different probability of developing into infant humans.
141
 They write that: 
 
...if we are to base degrees of potential on the probability of a person ultimately resulting 
from an embryo, we could not treat as crucially significant the line between the stage at 
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The thought here is that since the chance of an egg being fertilized in vitro is so high (Singer 
and Dawson claim that it is on average about 80%),
143
 there is „virtually‟ no difference 
between the probability of an egg and a particular spermatozoon used in IVF becoming a 
human being, and that of an in vitro embryo doing so.
144
  
   However, it seems that proponents of the compromise position could defend the thought 
that in vitro embryos have a degree of potential which warrants moral respect in other ways. 
Singer and Dawson‟s argument rests on the claim that we can only make sense of different 
degrees of potential in terms of the different probabilities
145
 of entities becoming that which 
they have the potential to become. However, it seems that we can also differentiate degrees of 
potential in accordance with how much intrinsic potential something has. With this in mind, 
the in vitro embryo seems to have undergone a significant development from being a pair of 
gamete cells, because it contains all the genetic material necessary to generate life in a single 
entity.
146
 It is, in Aristotelian language, the „final form‟ of the human being, because nothing 
more is added to the embryo or conjoined before its development into a person; all that we 
will ever physically be as humans is there in the embryo.
147
 Even when the sperm and egg are 
considered conjointly they do not constitute a “complex whole”
148
 in this way; they are not 
jointly directed to sustaining the existence of a particular entity in the way that an embryo is. 
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In this sense, the embryo is the first stage of human life which we can actually say that every 
human was at one point „one of these‟.
149
 
    As such, in spite of their similar probabilities of eventually becoming a person, it seems 
that proponents of the compromise position can still coherently argue that the in vitro embryo 
has a more significant degree of potential than other types of cells with passive potential. The 
reason for this is that the embryo has undergone a significant ontological development in 
becoming the „final form‟ of a human being. Even if it is highly probable that a gamete pair 
will itself develop to this stage, this still represents a significant ontological development 
which may be deemed an adequate basis for affording moral respect. 
   The following analogy supports the objection that I am making against Singer and Dawson, 
namely the thought that even if it is highly probable that some state of potential (call it state 
a) will develop into a more advanced state of potential (call it state b), it is possible to claim 
that this development is significant: Suppose that Paul is planning to assassinate John by 
putting poison in his tea. Furthermore, suppose that the likelihood of John drinking his tea is 
almost certain, and that the poison can potentially kill him if he doesn‟t receive the antidote. 
It seems that once Paul has put the poison in the tea, he has become John‟s potential 
murderer. However, even if the probability of John drinking his tea is high, it still seems that 
Paul‟s potential to kill John significantly increases after John has drunk the tea. A plausible 
reason for this is that John‟s act of drinking the poisoned tea is a significant, albeit highly 
probable development in the process of Paul killing John.  
    Admittedly, this example is somewhat disanalogous to the case of the in vitro embryos 
development, because Paul himself does not undergo any sort of ontological development. 
However, the point that this example highlights is that even if it is almost certain that state a 
                                                          
149
 McMahan (2007) disputes this point because of the lack of coordinated cell function in embryos, but 
concedes that the question of whether ‘we were once embryos’, “remains open” (p.81).  
62 
 
will develop into state b, this does not entail that state a should be equated with state b. With 
this in mind, although in vitro embryos and gamete pairs have similar probabilities of 
becoming persons, it seems open for proponents of the compromise position to point out that 
in vitro embryos have a more significant degree of potential, insofar as they have developed 
to the point of being the final form of a human being. In this way, they might coherently 
resist the view that we must treat as moral equals anything with the passive potential to 
become a person
150
; some things have more significant passive potential than others.
151
   
    To conclude this section, proponents of the compromise position are not confused about 
empirical facts when they claim that in vitro embryos can occupy a middle ground when we 
think about the moral significance of potential for personhood. All sides of the debate can 
deny that the passive potential of gamete pairs is morally significant, on the basis that they do 
not represent a complex whole that sustains a single entity in its development to personhood. 
They can also admit that implanted embryos have greater potential than in vitro embryos, 
insofar as they have active and not merely passive potential. However, it seems that there is a 
coherent basis for proponents of the compromise position to claim that in vitro embryos have 
a degree of potential which warrants moral respect, since they have undergone a significant 
ontological development in becoming the final form of human life. It is this which may be 
deemed to distinguish the in vitro embryo‟s potential as being sufficiently significant to 
warrant affording these embryos moral respect. 
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   I shall conclude this chapter by showing that the model of respect outlined above provides 
proponents of the compromise position with a response to three alternative views of potential, 
before explaining how this model can provide the groundwork for making a moral distinction 
between using unwanted embryos for hESC research and creating SCNT embryos for that 
specific purpose. 
        First, it might be argued that only embryos with active potential warrant moral 
respect.
152
 As the previous section explained, active potential is a more significant degree of 
potential than passive potential. However, this does not entail that passive potential cannot be 
morally significant. Indeed, if passive potentiality could not be morally significant, then one 
would be committed to the claim that there are no moral constraints upon what we can do 
with unwanted in vitro embryos.
153
 However, this does seem to be contrary to some of our 
moral intuitions. For example, as has already been asserted, the idea that we could destroy in 
vitro embryos in order to develop a new line of decorative cosmetics seems morally 
questionable.
 154
 Given the argument that this chapter has made, it seems possible to 
coherently justify the placing of some moral constraints upon our treatment of in vitro 
embryos by appealing to the moral significance of their passive potential. Although these 
embryos are reliant on extrinsic factors to fulfil their potential, this does not entail that their 
potential is therefore morally insignificant. 
   Second, it might be argued that we cannot talk of the embryo having the potential to 
become a person prior to 14 days of development, because until this time the embryo can 
twin into two separate individuals. The thought here is that when we talk of affording the 
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embryo moral status, we are not affording it to an identifiable individual. Rather, we should 
only afford moral status once the embryo is an identifiable individual human being.
 155
 
   This argument from non-individuation might be pertinent if we were considering the issue 
of assigning a right to life to the embryo, since assigning rights might arguably require that 
one can identify the individual entity to whom the right is being assigned to.
156
 However, as 
chapter two argued, there are other reasons for why it is inappropriate to ascribe a right to life 
to the embryo on the basis of its potential. Therefore, the pertinent question concerning this 
argument is whether it makes sense to talk of affording moral respect to something which is 
not an identifiable individual. There does not seem to be a convincing reason why not. The 
fact that the pre 14 day embryo may develop into more than one individual being does not 
alter the fact that the embryo has the potential to develop into at least one person; and after 
all, what seems to matter is that the embryo has the potential for personhood, not that it has 
the potential to be a particular person.
157
 Therefore, if the basis for respecting the embryo is 
its potential to develop into a person, the fact that the pre 14 day embryo is not an identifiable 
individual does not damage the claim that it should be afforded moral respect. 
    Finally, Devolder and Savulescu offer an alternative view of the embryo‟s potential, 
alluded to at the beginning of this chapter. According to their arguments, embryos only 
deserve moral protection if they are part of a parental project.
158
 The model of potential 
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outlined in this chapter explains why proponents of the compromise position can coherently 
afford the embryo moral respect even if it is not part of a parental project.  
   Devolder and Savulescu‟s argument relies on the premise that the embryo‟s potential to 
become a person depends on whether the parents of that embryo wish it to develop. Clearly, 
some embryos are never intended to realise their potential, and these embryos are not worthy 
of the same protection as an embryo which is wanted for reproductive purposes. Yet, 
proponents of the compromise position are likely to point out that this does not change the 
fact that embryos have an intrinsic degree of potential, independently of whether they are 
intended for reproductive purposes. Although an embryo which is not intended to develop 
beyond a certain stage cannot become a fully developed human of its own accord, to thereby 
dismiss the thought that it is a potential human being is to fail to appreciate just what sort of 
entity the embryo is. The embryo just is the first stage of human life which is essentially 
driven towards its own development when placed in the correct environment.
 159
 Even if a 
particular embryo is not intended to develop into a person, it still seems coherent for 
proponents of the compromise position to describe it as a having a degree of potential (which 
may be deemed morally significant) by virtue of the type of entity it is.  
   The following analogy supports this argument: Any human with the sufficient cognitive 
ability has the potential to learn the Chinese language fluently. The fact that a particular 
person is not motivated to fulfil this potential does not entail that he has lost the potential to 
learn Chinese. In a similar fashion, the fact that an embryo is not intended for reproductive 
purposes does not affect its intrinsic potential, that is to say the fact that an embryo has the 
genetic material to form a new person as the final form of a human being. The claim that this 
chapter has argued for is that this intrinsic potential provides a coherent basis for proponents 
of the compromise position to afford the embryo moral respect.  
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     V 
    Therefore, in this chapter I have claimed that proponents of the compromise position may 
coherently view the in vitro embryo as deserving of moral respect by virtue of its potential. 
Although the embryo has only the passive potential to become a person, it has a greater 
degree of potential than cells which do not warrant moral respect, because it has undergone a 
significant ontological development in becoming the final form of a human being.  
   This conclusion, and the account of respect formulated in chapter three conjointly offer a 
defence of the second assumption underlying the compromise position; namely that we can 
make sense of there being moral constraints upon the way in which we treat embryos, without 
ascribing rights to them. The conclusions that I have made in the preceding two chapters, 
suggest that we can make sense of setting moral constraints on our treatment of embryos, 
because they can coherently be viewed as deserving a degree of moral respect by virtue of 
their potential for personhood. To preview the next chapter of this thesis, the idea that the 
embryo deserves moral respect by virtue of its potential has important ramifications for how 
we might view the moral permissibility of therapeutic cloning. If we believe that we ought to 
afford the embryo moral respect, then it seems that we must constrain our treatment of 
embryos in such a way that honours this potential. In the next chapter of this thesis, I shall 
consider whether proponents of the compromise position can consistently claim that 








   In the previous two chapters, I argued that it is coherent for proponents of the compromise 
position to claim that we ought to set moral constraints on our treatment of embryos in order 
to afford them the moral respect they are due by virtue of their potential. With this in mind, I 
shall now consider the third assumption underlying the compromise position. This 
assumption stipulates that there is a moral difference between standard hESC research and 
therapeutic cloning, such that the latter, but not the former, violates the moral constraints that 
we ought to set on our treatment of embryos.  
   I shall argue that one can coherently draw a moral distinction between the two practices 
because therapeutic cloning may be deemed to violate the moral respect due to the embryo in 
a way that standard hESC research does not. However, I shall also claim that adopting this 
position requires adopting a diluted view of the extent to which we must place moral 
constraints on our treatment of embryos in order to afford them proper moral respect. This in 
turn will have significant implications for the overall tenability of the compromise position, 
which I shall consider in chapter six.  
    Following the literature, I shall refer to the claim that there is a moral difference between 
standard hESC research and therapeutic cloning as DCD (i.e. the Discarded Created 
Distinction). 
160
 This assumption has been the main focus of objections concerning the 
tenability of the compromise position. Although there intuitively seems to be a moral 
difference between destroying an unwanted embryo and creating an embryo for the sole 
purpose of hESC research, previous attempts to establish DCD are inadequate. Given the 
inadequacy of these arguments, some writers claim that the concept of a compromise position 
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between the liberal and conservative positions I outlined in chapter one is incoherent
161
; 
according to them, if we claim that standard hESC research is morally permissible, 
consistency demands that we also ought to claim that therapeutic cloning is morally 
permissible.  
   With this in mind, my strategy in this chapter shall be as follows. In the first section, I shall 
explain why previous attempts to establish DCD are inadequate. My argument in this section 
will also explain why I reject the assumption that the embryos which are destroyed in 
standard hESC research are „bound to die‟ which, as I explained in chapter one, is sometimes 
used in attempts to argue that standard hESC research is morally permissible.
162
 In the second 
section, I shall then identify an area where the two practices differ which seems morally 
significant. Finally, in the third section, I shall argue that the manner of this difference is such 
that the practice of therapeutic cloning may be deemed to violate the respect due to the 
embryo, in a way that standard hESC research does not. Accordingly, contra Sandel and 




   It is prudent at this stage to recap briefly what both standard hESC research and therapeutic 
cloning involve. In the former practice, unspecialised hESCs are derived from unwanted 
embryos, that is to say embryos which were created for IVF treatments, but were ultimately 
not required. In practice, these unwanted embryos are frozen until they are either discarded or 
destroyed in research. On the other hand, in therapeutic cloning cloned hESCs are derived 
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from an SCNT embryo which was created in order to provide hESCs of a particular genetic 
type. In both practices, the embryo is developed until the blastocyst stage, at which point its 
inner cell mass (which contains the hESCs) is extracted, destroying the embryo in the 
process. 
     Since the embryos are destroyed at exactly the same developmental stage in therapeutic 
cloning and standard hESC research, one cannot establish DCD by appealing to the nature of 
the entities which are destroyed in each practice; the two practices are morally equivalent to 
the extent that they both destroy embryos with a degree of potential which may be deemed 
morally significant.
163 
Furthermore, the hESCs are harvested from embryos using exactly the 
same procedure in both practices.
164
 However, some writers have attempted to establish DCD 
in spite of these similarities by appealing to certain moral principles. In this section, I shall 
outline two such attempts, before arguing that they both fail to establish DCD. I shall claim 
that they fail because neither of the principles which are appealed to in these attempts can be 
used to support a moral distinction between standard hESC research and therapeutic cloning. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I shall propose a new way in which proponents of the 
compromise position could establish DCD. 
   Outka appeals to a “Nothing is lost” principle in order to justify distinguishing the moral 
permissibility of the two practices. To paraphrase this principle
165
, Outka claims that it can be 
permissible to murder
166
 someone iff the following two conditions are met: First, that the 
victim is bound to die in a process which is not coextensive with one‟s plan to murder 
him/her, and second that a life can be saved by murdering the victim. The intuitive force 
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behind this principle is that by murdering the victim, „nothing is lost‟ because the victim will 
die in any case.  
   If we apply this principle to the practices under consideration, it seems that there is scope 
for arguing that standard hESC research is morally permissible, but that therapeutic cloning is 
not. Although it seems feasible to claim that both practices can meet the second condition, 
(since it might be argued that we will able to save lives by engaging in both therapeutic 
cloning and standard hESC research),
167
 it might be argued that only the practice of standard 
hESC research can meet the first condition. The argument here is that in standard hESC 
practice, the hESCs are derived from „doomed‟ embryos which are bound to die, whilst in 
therapeutic cloning the process by which the embryo is bound to be destroyed is coextensive 
with one‟s plan to destroy it. That is to say, the embryo will only be destroyed because one 
plans to destroy it in order to obtain a benefit through its destruction. Accordingly, 
therapeutic cloning cannot meet the first condition. 
   Alternatively, Fitzpatrick argues that appealing to the „intend/foresee‟ distinction can allow 
one to establish DCD.
168
 According to Fitzpatrick, the destruction of unwanted embryos is a 
foreseeable but unintended effect of IVF treatments. For Fitzpatrick, the intention underlying 
the creation of these embryos is that they will be used in reproduction; however, it just so 
happens that the nature of this process involves the destruction of embryos which are deemed 
surplus to requirements. Although this effect is foreseeable, he argues that one can feasibly 
engage in IVF treatments without strictly intending to destroy embryos. 
    On the other hand, the destruction of embryos in therapeutic cloning is not merely 
foreseen, but intended. As Fitzpatrick claims, one cannot aim to derive hESCs from these 
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embryos without also aiming to destroy them, because there is a constitutive relation
169
 
between the acts; that is to say that deriving hESCs does not merely cause the destruction of 
the embryo, but actually constitutes its destruction. Therefore, since therapeutic cloning 
involves creating cloned embryos with the intention of destroying them, Fitzpatrick argues 
that it can be morally distinguished from standard hESC research, because the destruction of 




   Let us assume that both the „intend/foresee‟ distinction and the „nothing is lost‟ principle 
are plausible.
171
 Prima facie, they both seem to highlight differences between the two 
practices which could form the basis for DCD.  However, neither principle is able to do so. 
Consider Fitzpatrick‟s argument first. He argues that the destruction of unwanted embryos is 
a foreseen but unintended side effect of IVF. Yet as Devolder points out, the destruction of 
unwanted embryos is not an unintended side effect of IVF, since there is nothing inherent to 
the practice which causes the embryos which are not used to be destroyed.
172
 For instance, 
these embryos could feasibly be frozen or adopted by other parents. Therefore, contrary to 
Fitzpatrick‟s argument, the destruction of unwanted embryos is not a foreseen but unintended 
side effect of IVF; rather, the destruction of unwanted embryos is a separate act from 
engaging in IVF, with a separate intention.
 
 
   One could reply here that although the process of IVF itself does not logically necessitate 
the destruction of unwanted embryos, in practical terms these embryos must be destroyed 
because there are not a sufficient number of parents willing to adopt them. One solution to 
this objection could be that these unwanted embryos should just remain frozen. However, 
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even if this were not an option, the more fundamental point is that even if the destruction of 
unwanted embryos might be a practical necessity, this is not a strong enough connection to 
justify the thought that the destruction of unwanted embryos is inextricably bound with the 
practice of IVF in such a way that we may say that their destruction is an unintended side 
effect of this practice, or that unwanted embryos are „bound to die‟.
173
 
   This objection has important ramifications for Fitzpatrick‟s argument. The aim of 
Fitzpatrick‟s argument is to explain why the creation and destruction of unwanted embryos in 
standard hESC research is morally permissible, and to do so in a manner which is consistent 
with the condemnation of therapeutic cloning. However, if the destruction of unwanted 
embryos is not a merely foreseeable and unintended side effect of IVF, a whole other 
argument is required in order to morally justify the destruction of these embryos in standard 
hESC research; it cannot be justified by applying the intend/foresee distinction. 
    Now consider Outka‟s argument. The application of the „nothing is lost‟ principle relies on 
the notion that the victim in question is unavoidably bound to die, since only then will 
„nothing be lost‟ by murdering him/her. However, as argued above, the unwanted embryos 
we are considering are not strictly bound to die; as such Outka‟s principle cannot be used to 
morally justify their destruction. In destroying an unwanted embryo, something is lost, 
because the embryo‟s destruction is a separate and intended action from its creation for IVF. 
   Moreover, one might even go further, and claim that not even the creation of unwanted 
embryos can be described as a merely foreseen consequence of IVF, since there is nothing 
inherent to the practice which absolutely requires the creation of unwanted embryos; we 
could feasibly engage in IVF by creating one embryo per treatment. Of course, using a large 
number of embryos in each treatment significantly increases the chance of a viable pregnancy 
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occurring. Moreover, given the cost of the procedure, and the moderately invasive nature of 
transferring embryos to the women, there are good reasons for why current IVF practices 
create more embryos than are likely to be needed. However, even acknowledging this, the 
creation of these embryos is still an intended action, and not an unavoidable consequence of 
engaging in artificial reproduction.  
    Again, this second point is damaging to both Outka‟s and Fitzgerald‟s arguments. 
Although the nothing is lost principle can justify standard hESC research if it is assumed that 
the embryos it uses are „bound to die‟ (which, I have argued in any case, they are not), the 
principle cannot explain why it is morally permissible to engage in the practice of IVF even if 
it involves creating embryos which are bound to die. Furthermore, it is possible to challenge 
Fitzpatrick‟s application of the intend/foresee distinction here. Even if the creation of 
unwanted embryos may be justifiable, it is an intended part of IVF treatments; as such it is 
not merely a foreseen, unfortunate side-effect. As such, both Outka‟s and Fitzgerald‟s 
attempts to morally justify standard hESC research also make the undefended assumption that 
IVF is morally permissible, even though it involves the intentional creation of unwanted 
embryos which are likely to be destroyed.
174
 
   Therefore, even if we accept the principles that Outka and Fitzgerald appeal to, their 
arguments are problematic in two ways. First, they attempt to justify the destruction of 
unwanted embryos by forging an illusory necessary relationship between this destruction and 
current IVF practices.  Second, they rely on the undefended assumption that IVF is morally 
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permissible even though it involves the intentional creation of embryos which are likely to be 
destroyed.
175
 As such, their attempts to morally justify standard hESC research fail.
 176
 
   The problem for proponents of the compromise position then is this: Although it seems 
possible to morally distinguish the act of destroying something which is bound to die, from 
the act of creating something in order to destroy it, this is not the actual issue at stake for 
proponents of the compromise position. Rather, the challenge for proponents of the 
compromise position is to explain why creating and then destroying embryos for research 
purposes is morally worse than intentionally creating surplus embryos for reproductive 
purposes, which are then destroyed. In the next section I shall explain a way in which it might 
be possible to respond to this challenge, before arguing in the final section that with this 
distinction in mind, it is possible to argue that therapeutic cloning, but not standard hESC 
research, is incompatible with affording the proper moral respect due to the embryo. 
 
II 
   Although Fitzgerald‟s argument was found to be flawed, it seems that it was correct to 
highlight the relevance of the intentions underlying the creation of the embryos in the two 
forms of hESC research. It seems that the difference between the two forms of research 
which people attach moral importance to is that only therapeutic cloning involves creating 
embryos with the sole intention of destroying them; it might be argued that this seems to 
involve treating the embryos in a particularly exploitative manner.
177
 With this in mind, this 
section will elucidate the basis for this intuition in a manner which allows one to claim that 
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creating and then destroying embryos for research purposes is morally worse than creating 
unwanted embryos which are likely to be destroyed for reproductive purposes. 
    It seems that the intention underlying an action can influence the way in which we morally 
judge that action. Furthermore, the same act carried out for different intentions can convey 
different attitudes towards the subject of that act. To illustrate, consider this example. Two 
parents might encourage their son to become a lawyer because they think that their son will 
particularly enjoy that career path. On the other hand, they might encourage their son to 
become a lawyer solely because they think that he will earn enough money to give them an 
affluent retirement. In these cases, the same act conveys different attitudes towards the son 
because of the different intentions underlying the action. Furthermore, it seems that we can 
morally judge the parents on the attitude expressed by their intentions. 
   With this in mind, it seems that the intention with which the embryos are created in 
therapeutic cloning might convey a different attitude towards the embryo than the intention 
with which they are created in IVF.
178
 I shall consider what attitudes are expressed by these 
practices in the following section. The important point for this section is the thought that the 
different intentions underlying the creation of the embryos in each case can express different 
attitudes towards the embryo. This difference might form the basis for morally distinguishing 
therapeutic cloning from standard hESC research if only one attitude is deemed to be 
consonant with the moral respect owed to the embryo. 
   However, Gerrand seems to object to the argument sketched above. She claims that: 
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The thought here is that therapeutic cloning and standard hESC research should be deemed 
morally equivalent because they both ultimately treat the embryo in exactly the same way. 
Even if unwanted embryos are created with the intention that they will become persons, the 
fact of the matter is that they are destroyed, and we should base our moral judgement of both 
practices on how they are finally used.  
   The basis of this objection is the principle that we should always base our moral appraisals 
upon final outcome, rather than possible but uninstantiated outcomes, even if these latter 
outcomes are intended. This may be right if one adopts a wholly consequentialist moral 
outlook, but the principle is highly contentious. Consider its application in this example: 
Suppose that Alan forces Ben to play a version of Russian roulette in which there is only a 
20% chance of survival. If Ben survives he will receive some substantial good (say £1000), 
but Alan‟s intention for forcing Ben to play is that Ben will not survive. Suppose that against 
the odds Ben does survive and wins this good; it would seem odd to say that Alan‟s forcing 
Ben to play was a moral act because it brought about this good outcome. Here, the intended 
possible but uninstantiated outcome seems to impinge on the way in which we morally judge 
Alan‟s act. 
  We may concede to Gerrand that final outcomes play an important part in how we morally 
appraise our actions. However, to claim that intended but uninstantiated possible outcomes 
cannot influence the moral appraisal of an action seems incorrect. We incorporate the 
intention underlying an action, and not just the outcome of that action when we morally 
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appraise it. For instance, this is reflected in the fact that many countries have strict penalties 
for attempted murder as well as actual murder. Therefore, contra Gerrand, it seems that the 
intention for which cloned embryos and unwanted embryos are created can influence our 
moral judgement of their creation.  
   Accordingly, this section has identified an area in which therapeutic cloning and standard 
hESC research differ which could be morally significant, and incorporates the thought that 
neither the creation nor destruction of unwanted embryos is a necessary side effect of IVF. 
Even if we agree that both therapeutic cloning and standard hESC research involve the 
intentional creation and destruction of embryos, it still seems that we might be able to 
morally distinguish the practices by virtue of the different attitudes expressed towards the 
embryo in each practice. In the next section, I shall argue that the attitude expressed towards 
the embryo in therapeutic cloning is incompatible with affording the embryo proper moral 
respect, but that the attitude expressed in standard hESC research is compatible with 
affording this respect. The reason for this is that the intention underlying the creation of 
SCNT embryos in therapeutic cloning fails to acknowledge the embryo‟s potential in any 
way, whilst the intention underlying the creation of the unwanted embryos used in standard 
hESC research does, albeit to a limited extent. 
 
III 
   In order to make this argument, it is prudent to recap the model of respect outlined so far in 
this thesis. According to the model of respect I have developed, embryos may coherently be 
viewed as deserving moral respect by virtue of their potential, and the way in which we 
afford proper moral respect to something is by setting constraints on our behaviour which 
safeguard or honour whatever is morally significant about that thing. Furthermore, the 
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previous section of this chapter argued that we may be able to morally distinguish the 
practices of therapeutic cloning and standard hESC research by analysing the attitudes 
expressed by the intention underlying the creation of the embryos used in each practice.  
   Accordingly, the important question for this section is the nature of the attitudes expressed 
towards the embryo by the intention underlying its creation in each form of hESC research. In 
order for the third assumption underlying the compromise position to be sound, it seems that 
the attitude expressed by the intention underlying the creation of SCNT embryos in 
therapeutic cloning must be incompatible with affording proper moral respect to the embryo; 
Conversely, the attitude expressed by the intention underlying the creation of the unwanted 
embryos used in standard hESC research must be compatible with affording proper moral 
respect  
    Let us consider the case of therapeutic cloning first. The intention underlying the creation 
of the embryo in this practice is to obtain a medical resource through the embryo‟s 
destruction. Although, the ultimate intention of obtaining hESCs is to alleviate suffering 
through using this resource, one cannot obtain hESCs without intending to destroy an 
embryo; as I explained above, deriving hESCs is constitutive of destroying the embryo. As 
such, even if the fundamental motive for creating a cloned embryo is to alleviate suffering, 
this does not alter the fact that cloned embryos are created in therapeutic cloning with the 
intention that they will be destroyed.   
   The attitude that this intention conveys towards the embryo lacks any appreciation of the 
embryo‟s potential. The embryo is never regarded as a potential person, but only as a medical 
resource; for this reason, this attitude strikes many as particularly exploitative.
180
 As such, 
there seems to be a basis for claiming that the attitude expressed towards the embryo in 
therapeutic cloning is incompatible with affording it the proper moral respect it is due by 
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virtue of its potential; the practice just fails to view the embryo as a potential person at any 
point. As such, the practice neither honours or safeguard‟s that which may be deemed 
morally relevant about the embryo. 
   One may respond at this point that the fact that SCNT embryos are never viewed as 
potential persons means that they do not have any potential for life. This is similar to the 
parental project argument I considered in chapter three, which I argued does not succeed in 
proving that unwanted embryos lose their potential for life.
181
 However, there is another 
sense in which one may question whether SCNT embryos have the potential for life, insofar 
as there is no empirical evidence that a human SCNT embryo would successfully develop to 
term. As such, it might be argued that the SCNT embryos do not deserve moral respect, 
because we have no evidence that they have the potential for life.
182
 
   However, this argument is unconvincing. First, although a human SCNT embryo has not 
been produced (given legal and moral prohibitions on reproductive cloning), SCNT embryos 
of many other species have been successfully developed to term. Although we cannot always 
extrapolate results obtained in experiments on other animals to humans, the evidence we have 
from these experiments at least suggests that a human SCNT embryo could be similarly 
developed. Second, although we have no empirical evidence of a human SCNT embryo 
developing to term, neither do we have any evidence that it would not. Given this uncertainty, 
it seems right that we should err on the side of caution;
183
 as far as we know, SCNT embryos 
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   Therefore, therapeutic cloning may coherently be viewed as being incompatible with the 
moral respect due to the embryo. The next step in the argument in favour of the third 
assumption underlying the compromise position is to establish that one can afford the embryo 
proper moral respect in standard hESC research. Devolder argues that this is not possible. She 
argues that permitting standard hESC research amounts to permitting the creation of embryos 
which have a good chance of being destroyed only in order to aid infertile couples, since our 
current IVF practices involve creating many more embryos than are ever likely to come to 
term
185
 (from which the unwanted embryos used in standard hESC research are sourced). 
    The problem which Devolder highlights here is that it is dishonest to attempt to morally 
justify the creation of unwanted embryos by claiming that they are all created with the 
intention of becoming a person; the fact of the matter is that most of the embryos which are 
created in current IVF practices will not develop to term.
186
 Arguably, this might not be 
problematic if the creation of unwanted embryos was an unavoidable part of producing an 
embryo which would develop to term. If this were the case, then one might attempt to justify 
the destruction of unwanted embryos as a being a necessary means of bringing about a new 
life. However, as we saw when considering Outka and Fitzpatrick‟s argument, the creation of 
unwanted embryos is neither necessary nor unavoidable in this way.  
   As I argued above, one of the problems with both Outka‟s and Fitzgerald‟s attempts to 
establish DCD is that they assume without argument that the creation of unwanted embryos 
which will be destroyed in IVF is morally permissible.  In a similar vein, it might be argued 
here that if we wish to afford moral respect to embryos by virtue of their potential, we should 
painstakingly fertilise eggs in IVF one at a time in order to rule out the possibility of creating 
unwanted embryos which will be destroyed. According to this vein of thought, the likelihood 
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that a vast number of the embryos created for IVF will be destroyed seems to make their 
creation a „moral hazard‟ in the Kantian sense.  
   For Kant, it is a basic moral principle which requires no proof that “one ought to hazard 
nothing that may be Wrong”.
187
 In the context of this chapter, if the creation of so many 
embryos in IVF makes it likely that we will have to destroy a large number of unwanted 
embryos, it might be argued that we should not permit the creation of this many embryos in 
the first place. In this way, the creation of unwanted embryos might be deemed a moral 
hazard, and thereby jeopardise the thought that creating unwanted embryos in IVF is 
compatible with affording the embryo moral respect. 
   One reply to this argument could be to concede that current IVF practices fail to afford 
proper moral respect to the embryo. However, since legislating bodies which adopt the 
compromise position also permit IVF as it is currently practiced, they cannot make this 
concession. Therefore, in order to argue that the compromise position is valid as a legislative 
policy, it must be established that the creation of more embryos than are necessary in IVF 
(which provides the source of embryos used in standard hESC research) is not a moral 
hazard. It is to this issue I now turn. 
    If we believe that our current IVF practices succeed in affording proper moral respect to 
the embryo, then the moral constraints that we set on our treatment of embryos in order to 
afford them proper moral respect must be very relaxed. Not only does the practice involve the 
creation of embryos which are likely to be destroyed, but the creation of these embryos is 
both intentional, and avoidable. As such, this seems to be a weak version of moral respect. 
However, that is not to say that it is incoherent to claim that moral respect is afforded to the 
embryo in current IVF practices. Here, the intention of the practice considered as a whole 
seems to play a role. Even if the practice involves the intentional and avoidable creation and 
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destruction of embryos, there still seems to be some scope for claiming that the practice is 
compatible with affording a degree of moral respect, because the purpose of the practice for 
which the embryos are initially created is in keeping with the morally relevant aspect of the 
embryo, its potential. After all, the purpose of IVF is to produce a new person.  
   This thought represents a possible defence which proponents of the compromise position 
could make to one of Devolder‟s arguments. Devolder argues that the two forms of hESC 
research cannot be morally distinguished by appealing to the embryo‟s potential, because 
they both destroy embryos with the same degree of potential.
188
 However, although both 
therapeutic cloning and standard hESC research destroy embryos with the same degree of 
potential, it seems open for proponents of the compromise position to claim that the former, 
but not the latter, does so in a manner which is incompatible with the respect due to the 
embryo. The reason for this is that the purpose underlying this practice fails to acknowledge 
the embryo‟s potential in any way, unlike IVF, which provides the source of embryos in 
standard hESC research. 
   Opponents of the compromise position are likely to point out here that therapeutic cloning 
involves creating embryos which will be destroyed for an equally beneficial goal (i.e. aiding 
the infirm), and as such should also be deemed as compatible with the moral respect owed to 
embryos. However, the problem with this reply is that the fact that something is used for 
equally beneficial goals in two different circumstances does not entail that appropriate respect 
is afforded in both cases.   
   Consider this analogy. Suppose that an army unit mistakenly ends up in a dangerous 
position on the battlefield. In order to rescue them, a general orders a soldier onto the 
battlefield in order to draw enemy fire from the retreating unit. It seems that the soldier is 
used in an instrumental fashion here, but not in a way which violates the respect he is due as a 
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 Although his life is endangered in order to save the unit, this order seems to be in 
keeping with his role as a soldier.  
   However, it seems that the soldier could be used in an instrumental fashion which would be 
incompatible with the respect he is due as a soldier, even if this use had a similarly beneficial 
goal. Suppose that the unit is not retreating from a battlefield, but has become embroiled in a 
gun battle with thugs that members of the unit have aggravated in a nearby town. If the 
general were to order the soldier to draw fire from the unit in this circumstance, this seems to 
fail to afford the respect the soldier is due; such an act does not seem to fall under his remit as 
a soldier. Accordingly, even though he would be doing the same sort of act in order to bring 
about the same sort of consequence, ordering the soldier to risk his life in one circumstance 
seems to be compatible with affording him proper respect, whilst ordering him to do so in 
another is not. 
    In a similar fashion, even if embryos which are created in IVF and therapeutic cloning are 
created and destroyed for an equally beneficial purpose, this does not entail that both 
practices afford embryos proper moral respect. Since the intention of therapeutic cloning is 
never to bring about a new person, it is possible to consistently claim that therapeutic cloning 
fails to afford the embryo proper moral respect, whilst IVF does, even though both practices 
seem to create and destroy embryos in a somewhat cavalier manner. Even though the goal of 
aiding the infirm is undoubtedly a beneficial consequence of creating and destroying 
embryos, this goal fails to acknowledge that the embryo is a potential person. In contrast, the 
creation and destruction of embryos in a process whose purpose is to bring about a new life 
might arguably be deemed to acknowledge the embryo as a potential person.  
   Therefore, it seems that the different attitudes expressed towards the embryo by the 
intentions underlying the creation of the embryos destroyed in each form of hESC research 
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provide a basis for accepting the third assumption underlying the compromise position. Even 
though IVF involves the creation of many more embryos than will come to term, the creation 
of these embryos seems to be compatible with affording them moral respect. The reason for 
this is that the purpose of the practice as a whole is compatible with affording the moral 
respect the embryo may be due by virtue of its potential. As such, the creation of unwanted 
embryos in IVF need not be a moral hazard. In contrast, the attitude expressed towards the 
embryo by the intention underlying the creation of SCNT embryos in therapeutic cloning 
fails to acknowledge the embryo‟s potential in any way; as such, it may be coherent to view 
the practice as being incompatible with affording proper moral respect to the embryo. 
   Before considering the possible ramifications of this conclusion, I shall consider two replies 
to this position. First, it might be argued that standard hESC research is incompatible with 
affording the embryo proper moral respect just because it involves the destruction of 
embryos. The thought here is that if we should afford moral respect the embryo by virtue of 
its potential, destroying any embryo entails disrespecting it, because it puts an end to that 
potential. The thought here is that we should constrain our behaviour in such a way that 
safeguards, rather than merely honours the embryo‟s potential. 
    The first thing to say in reply to this objection is that both sides of the debate can agree that 
it is possible to afford moral respect to something that one destroys.
 190
 For example, it seems 
possible to consistently afford moral respect to animals whilst farming them in a humane 
fashion; the way in which it is appropriate to constrain our behaviour towards something can 
vary according to what is deemed morally relevant about that being. Therefore, destroying 
something need not be incompatible with affording it moral respect. The important thing to 
establish is whether the embryo in particular is the sort of being whose destruction is 
incompatible with affording it proper moral respect.  
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   As it has already been argued, the embryo‟s potential is insufficient to making its life 
inviolable.
191
 As such, it seems open for a proponent of the compromise position to reply that 
although the embryo‟s potential confers some value upon its life, this can be outweighed by 
other values. Therefore, affording respect to the embryo by virtue of its potential does not 
entail that we always ought to preserve that potential at the expense of other valuable 
outcomes.
192
 Accordingly, proponents of the compromise position can claim that viewing the 
embryo as deserving moral respect by virtue of its potential does not mean that we cannot 
morally destroy embryos; it just means that we should honour the embryo‟s status as a 
potential person when we create them, and that their destruction should not be taken lightly. 
As I claimed in my analysis of respect, we can afford respect by honouring that which is 
morally relevant about a being, as well as safeguarding it.
193
  
    Both Devolder and Harris separately offer a possible way to solve the dilemma of 
affording respect to the embryo whilst practicing therapeutic cloning.
194
 Both Devolder and 
Harris claim that one could enter all of the SCNT embryos created for therapeutic cloning 
into a „reproduction lottery‟. Here, all the SCNT embryos created for therapeutic cloning 
would all be given an equal chance of „winning‟ the chance to be implanted into a womb, 
whilst the rest would all be destroyed in order to derive cloned hESCs. The thought behind 
this response is that it would allow researchers to create SCNT embryos for research in a 
manner which respects the embryo‟s potential, since each SCNT embryo can be viewed as a 
potential person prior to the lottery. 
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    However, this is not a convincing response for two reasons. First, the reproduction lottery 
would be not be a workable solution, since implanting SCNT embryos would amount to 
reproductive cloning, which is almost universally condemned.
195
 However, the more 
important flaw in the response is that it misses the point of the argument being made in this 
chapter, since the embryos entered into the reproduction lottery are still intended for hESC 
research. The point of the argument I have made in this chapter is not that each embryo we 
create should have a chance of survival; rather it is that the embryo should be created for a 
purpose which is compatible with the respect owed to it as a potential person. However, in 
the reproduction lottery if the need for hESCs were not present, these embryos would not be 
created. As such, the embryos created are still created for the purpose of destruction; it just so 
happens that in one particular case, an embryo is not destroyed.  
   
IV 
   Therefore, the third assumption underlying the compromise position is sound. I have argued 
that there is a moral difference between standard hESC research and therapeutic cloning, such 
that in carrying out the latter, but not the former, we violate a moral constraint that 
proponents of the compromise position claim that we should place on our treatment of 
embryos. I have argued that one might coherently view therapeutic cloning as being 
incompatible with affording the embryo proper moral respect, whilst viewing standard hESC 
research as being compatible with affording the embryo proper moral respect. As such, 
proponents of the compromise position may claim coherently claim that standard hESC 
research is morally permissible. The reason for this is that the embryo may be deemed to 
deserve moral respect by virtue of its potential, and the unwanted embryos destroyed in 
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standard hESC research were initially created for a practice which honours this potential. 
However, since the SCNT embryos created for therapeutic cloning were not created for an 
intention which honours this potential, the practice may coherently be deemed to violate the 
constraints that we ought to place on our treatment of embryos in order to afford them proper 
moral respect. 
   However, this conclusion is not as useful for proponents of the compromise position as it 
first appears. Adopting this view requires diluting the moral constraints which are necessary 
for affording the embryo moral respect; if the creation of unwanted embryos is not to be a 
moral hazard, then it cannot be wrong to avoidably and intentionally produce more embryos 
than are required in IVF treatments. Although I have argued that such a position is tenable, 
the diluted form of moral respect which is necessary for this position may have ramifications 














    
    To take stock, in the preceding chapters I have argued that the first three assumptions 
underlying the compromise position are sound. In effect, the argument to this point has 
established that proponents of the compromise position can coherently claim two things. 
First, they may claim that standard hESC is morally permissible, in spite of the fact that it 
involves the destruction of embryos. They may do so, because it is coherent to claim that the 
embryo does not have a right to life, and that carrying out standard hESC research does not 
violate the moral constraints that we ought to place on our treatment of embryos if we are to 
afford them proper moral respect. Second, they may claim that there is a moral difference 
between therapeutic cloning and standard hESC research, since carrying out the former 
practice is incompatible with affording the proper moral respect due to embryos by virtue of 
their potential.  
   However, if the compromise position is to be tenable, one final assumption needs to be 
defended; namely the assumption that it is morally impermissible to fail to act in accordance 
with the constraints that we should place on our treatment of embryos, or rather the 
constraints that we should place in order to afford proper moral respect. In this chapter, I shall 
argue that one can coherently accept the truth of this assumption by appealing to three 
possible justifications. In conjunction with my defence of the other assumptions underlying 
the compromise position, this argument will lead to the conclusion that the compromise 
position is tenable. However, I shall also suggest that the compromise position may yet be an 
unappealing position to maintain. Although I cannot provide a conclusive argument for this 
point in this work, my basis for this suggestion will be that there are reasons for doubting the 
plausibility of these justifications for accepting the fourth assumption. As such, I shall 
conclude that the compromise position is a tenable, but also unappealing position.    
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    My strategy in making this argument shall be as follows: In the first part of this chapter, I 
shall explain that some opponents of therapeutic cloning fail to acknowledge the importance 
of this assumption, and thereby fail to demonstrate that therapeutic cloning is morally 
impermissible. In the remainder of the chapter, I shall explain how this assumption can be 
challenged. In order to do so, I shall provide an analysis of moral impermissibility in the 
second section, before considering what might bear on our judgement of whether a violation 
of moral respect could be deemed morally permissible in the third section. In the fourth 
section, I shall consider the case of therapeutic cloning in view of this analysis, and conclude 
that although one may plausibly accept the fourth assumption, there are reasons for doubting 
the justifications for doing so. Accordingly, I shall conclude that the compromise position is a 
tenable, albeit unappealing, position to adopt concerning the moral permissibility of different 
forms of hESC research. 
 
I  
   Prima facie, the fact that therapeutic cloning violates the moral respect due to the embryo 
might seem to entail that the practice is morally impermissible. However, in this section, I 
shall argue that some writers who appeal to the notion of moral respect have failed to 
demonstrate that therapeutic cloning is morally impermissible, because they fail to justify the 
fourth assumption that I have delineated in this thesis.
196
 
   One of the problems with the discussion of the moral permissibility of therapeutic cloning 
to this point has been that, as Lysaught points out, when the term „moral respect‟ is invoked 
in this debate, no-one has taken particular care to delineate what affording moral respect 
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 For instance, Callahan seems to adopt the position that therapeutic cloning is 
incompatible with affording the moral respect owed to embryos, whilst the NIH report he 
attacks in his paper seems to propose that therapeutic cloning is compatible with affording 
proper moral respect to the embryo.
198
 I agree with Lysaught‟s diagnosis of this problem, and 
have attempted to remedy this lack of precision in this thesis by giving an account of moral 
respect, and explaining why therapeutic cloning may be deemed to violate the moral respect 
due to the embryo. 
   However, a further problem with the use of the term „respect‟ in this context is that the 
positions which have appealed to the notion of respect have overlooked important features of 
the concept. To divide the debate into those on the one hand who believe that therapeutic 
cloning violates the moral respect due to the embryo, and those on the other who do not, can 
lead to the conclusion that the only moral question to be answered here is whether or not 
therapeutic cloning is compatible with the affording the proper moral respect due to the 
embryo. Although my argument aligns with the former side of the debate, I do not believe 
that this entails that I must join Callahan in arguing that therapeutic cloning is morally 
impermissible. To illustrate why, it is useful to consider a claim from Lysaught‟s argument.  
   In a similar vein to Callahan, Lysaught castigates the USA National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission Report (NBAC) on hESC research, because the report states that the embryo 
deserves moral respect, yet goes on to endorse therapeutic cloning as morally licit.
 199
 In view 
of this Lysaught claims that the NBAC‟s use of the term „respect‟ “collapses”,
200
 citing the 
following quote from the report in support of her view:  
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(Although) the human embryo and fetus deserve respect as forms of human life, the scientific 
and clinical benefits of stem cell research should not be foregone.
201
 
    
   Lysaught seems to interpret the NBAC report here to be making the problematic claim that 
we can engage in therapeutic cloning whilst affording the embryo proper moral respect.
202
 
However, the quote that Lysaught cites actually suggests something different. The quote does 
not suggest that the NBAC regards therapeutic cloning as compatible with affording 
appropriate moral respect; it only states that the benefits of therapeutic cloning are sufficient 
to outweigh the moral respect due to the embryo. This is consistent with the claim that 
affording proper respect to the embryo entails refraining from therapeutic cloning. However, 
one might claim, as the NBAC does, that it is still permissible to carry out the practice.  The 
reason why such a claim is plausible is that our judgement concerning the moral 
permissibility of therapeutic cloning should take into account both the thought that the 
embryo deserves moral respect, but also the thought that we may have moral reasons to 
engage in the practice. As such, the claim made in the above quote does not mean that the 
NBAC‟s understanding of moral respect „collapses‟; it just means that there are other moral 
considerations which weigh against the considerations of respect in our judgements 
concerning the moral permissibility of therapeutic cloning. 
   Therefore, it seems that an important question has been overlooked in some of the literature 
concerning the moral permissibility of therapeutic cloning, namely the question of whether it 
can ever be permissible to violate the moral respect due to an entity.
203
 Until it can be proven 
that this cannot be the case, then the attempt to claim that therapeutic cloning is morally 
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impermissible because it violates the moral respect due to the embryo is incomplete. As such, 
it is important to make the fourth assumption underlying the compromise position explicit. In 
the remainder of this chapter, I shall investigate the plausibility of this assumption. 
 
II 
    To begin this investigation, it is prudent to consider the nature of moral permissibility. 
When we say that an act is „morally impermissible‟, we mean that acting morally precludes 
the performance of that act; we might say that we have a negative moral obligation to refrain 
from performing that act, and that failing to act in accordance with this obligation constitutes 
a moral wrong. It seems that there are two senses in which we can describe an act as being 
morally impermissible. According to some moral theories,
204
 some acts are intrinsically 
wrong to such an extent that they must never be carried out, no matter what the 
countervailing moral considerations in favour of doing so may be. As such, abstaining from 
that act must take priority over all other considerations in one‟s moral deliberations; 
„whatever we do, we must not do that‟.  Call this strong impermissibility.  
   One act which it seems may appropriately be described as morally impermissible in this 
strong sense is rape; for some, it might be claimed that one could never justify rape as being 
morally permissible, even if there were countervailing considerations in favour of doing so. 
For instance, consider the following case. We can imagine an army trying to depose an evil 
dictator with limited success. Although the dictator‟s subjects despise him, they are too 
scared to rise against him, or to join the invading army, despite the fact that the dictator 
subjects the citizens to unjust hardship. Suppose that if the soldiers of the invading army 
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raped some women in the capital city, they could convince the citizens that the rapes were the 
work of their tyrannical dictator‟s police; suppose further that this would be enough to 
convince the citizens to aid the invading army, and would almost certainly lead to the 
removal of the evil dictator. Here, there may be a significant moral reason to carry out the 
rapes in order to bring about the removal of the dictator, but it still seems jarring to claim that 
the rapes would be morally permissible; it seems plausible to claim that there is something 
especially wrong about the act of rape, such that it can never be deemed morally permissible. 
As such, it might arguably be regarded as an impermissible act in the strong sense that I 
described above. 
   In contrast, there may be acts which might be deemed impermissible in one context, but 
permissible in another because of countervailing considerations in that context. Consider the 
case of killing the innocent. In normal situations, most would claim that this act is morally 
impermissible. However, in some circumstances, it may be claimed that certain moral 
considerations can outweigh the negative obligation we have to refrain from killing the 
innocent, for example in the exigencies of war. Accordingly, we might say that killing the 
innocent is morally impermissible, but only in a pro tanto sense; it is a moral consideration 
that it can be morally justifiable to overrule in favour of other considerations. Call this sort of 
impermissibility, „pro tanto impermissibility‟. 
    With this distinction in mind, we can begin to assess to what extent it may be deemed 
morally impermissible to violate the moral respect that an entity is due. Let us consider strong 
moral impermissibility first. For an act to be morally impermissible in this sense, it was 
claimed that the act must be intrinsically wrong to the extent that it can never qualify as a 
morally permitted action.  I also claimed that an act‟s being morally impermissible in this 
strong sense means that refraining from that act ought to take priority in our moral 
deliberations. Accordingly, one way of investigating whether violations of moral respect are 
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impermissible in this strong sense is to investigate whether refraining from violations of 
moral respect deserve such priority in our moral deliberations.  
   Given the analysis of the language of respect and the language of rights in chapter three, I 
do not believe that this is the case. The reason for this is that, according to my earlier 
analysis, the concept of strong moral impermissibility, if it is to be accepted at all, does not 
belong to the language of respect. In chapter three, I argued that we use the concept of a right 
to safeguard what we believe should take priority in our moral deliberations; in contrast, we 
use the language of respect to articulate moral claims or considerations that do not amount to 
right claims.
205
 With this in mind, we can understand how the concept of strong moral 
impermissibility can be a part of the language of rights. As I argued above, designating 
something as morally impermissible in the strong sense signifies that refraining from that act 
ought to take priority in our moral deliberations; as such, the concept of strong 
impermissibility seems to be related in some way to the concept of a right claim.
206
  
   Conversely, I argued that considerations of respect can be subsidiary to other moral 
considerations, including the consideration involved in rights claims; as such it does not seem 
appropriate to claim that considerations of respect should always take deliberative priority. 
Moreover, I also argued in chapter three that respect is a gradable concept
207
; accordingly, the 
moral respect owed to one thing might be deemed to deserve priority in our moral 
deliberation over the moral respect owed to something else. As such, the concept of strong 
impermissibility seems inappropriate in the language of respect.
 208
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   Therefore, according to the previous analysis of the language of respect in this thesis, it is 
not appropriate to describe a violation of moral respect as morally impermissible in the strong 
sense. This can be contrasted with the rape example considered above; in this case, it seemed 
that not even a significant countervailing moral consideration could lead us to judge that rape 
is morally permissible.  Conversely, since certain moral considerations can take priority over 
considerations of moral respect, it is inappropriate to claim that a violation of moral respect is 
morally impermissible in this strong sense.
209
 Accordingly, it seems that violations of moral 
respect are only pro tanto impermissible.  
   This point might seem contentious, since it might seem that some violations of moral 
respect should be deemed morally impermissible in the strong sense; one example might be 
an act which violates moral respect in an obscene manner, such as the mutilation of a human 
corpse. I cannot respond to this objection at length here; however, I shall mention two 
considerations which could form a response. First, it is perhaps inappropriate to trust our 
intuitions here, because it is difficult to imagine a case when there could be any moral 
consideration which would require us to engage in such an obscene act; yet this does not 
entail that there could not be some consideration which could outweigh the considerations of 
respect here.
210
 Second, it seems that it is the obscene nature of the violation, rather than the 
violation per se, that we find intuitively impermissible here. This does not challenge the 
thought that non-obscene violations of moral respect are not appropriately described as 
impermissible in the strong sense. 
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      To take stock, the argument I made above suggests that violations of moral respect are 
pro tanto impermissible. The remainder of this section will elaborate on this. One way of 
understanding the way in which we make judgements concerning pro tanto impermissibility 
is as a rational process in which we decide what is permissible in a given situation or context, 
according to the strength of the reasons that we have in favour of performing each action.
211
 
One sort of reason we can have is a prudential reason, that is, a reason for acting that appeals 
to the increase in one‟s welfare that the act will result in. We can also have moral reasons for 
acting. Here, the reason for acting may be that the act is required by some moral principle, or 
because our act may have consequences for something which deserves moral consideration. 
An important attribute of such moral reasons is that they trump prudential reasons, at least for 
those who are part of the moral community, or what Williams terms „the morality system‟.
212
 
Accordingly, if we have a prudential reason to act in some way, but a moral reason to refrain 
from acting in that way, we must judge the act to be morally impermissible. 
     However, in some cases we may need to decide whether to act in accordance with one set 
of moral reasons, or with a different set of moral reasons. In such cases, our judgement about 
the moral permissibility of an act may be viewed as a judgement about which moral reasons 
should take priority, where the act which we have strongest moral reason to carry out is 
deemed morally permissible. In the context of this chapter, it seems that the fact that 
something deserves moral respect gives us a moral reason to constrain our behaviour in some 
way. Accordingly, if there is a moral reason in favour of performing an act which violates 
moral respect, our judgement of moral permissibility requires a judgement concerning which 
of those reasons should take priority. The next section of this chapter shall consider this. 
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    A general account of which moral reasons should take precedence in our judgements 
concerning moral permissibility would be impossible in the length of a chapter. Therefore, I 
shall consider an example which is analogous to the case that this thesis considers, and 
elucidate the nature of the moral reasons that can bear on the morally permissibility of 
violating moral respect in this example, before considering the case of therapeutic cloning in 
the final section. 
   During World War 2, the Nazis used inmates of their concentration camps in painful and 
often fatal medical experiments without consent. Although many of these experiments were 
conducted only out of a sadistic curiosity, some were designed to provide useful scientific 
information. One such experiment involved testing the limits of the inmates‟ endurance in 
freezing temperatures. Researchers then tested which treatments were most effective on 
hypothermic subjects who survived.
213
  Since these experiments exposed living human 
subjects to fatal temperatures, Nazi researchers obtained a unique set of data in this medical 
area; there is no morally acceptable means by which we could obtain data as useful as that 
obtained in the Nazi experiments.
 214
  Therefore, researchers are faced with the question of 
whether it would be morally permissible to use the Nazi data in order to develop new 
treatments for hypothermia, in spite of the immoral means by which the data was obtained.  
   First, let us consider the moral reasons against using the data. It might be claimed that there 
are no moral reasons against using the data if it is used for a good purpose; it might be 
claimed that doing so is to „make the best out of the tragedy‟, or to give meaning to the 
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suffering of the victims. This is an understandable view, yet I reject it in this case. In some 
cases, making the best out of a tragedy may be compatible with affording respect. For 
instance, suppose a man murdered in an attempt to prevent a robbery could be used as an 
organ donor for several patients. It seems that using the organs need not disrespect the victim, 
presuming that family members consent to it; it seems that to do so here may appropriately be 
seen as „making the best‟ out of the tragic events.   
   However, there is an important disanalogy between this example and the case of the Nazi 
data. The tragic events that transpired in the Nazi camps were (in this case) brought about for 
the purpose of advancing medical knowledge. Accordingly, for us to benefit from this 
knowledge seems to fulfil the evil aims underlying these experiments, and to vindicate their 
dehumanising nature. There is no parallel here in the robbery murder case, since the victim 
was not killed for the purpose of providing organs for dying patients; as such, benefitting 
from this event does not fulfil the aims of an evil motive underlying the event in the same 
way that the use of Nazi data does. 
    Therefore, it seems plausible to claim that using the Nazi data would violate the moral 
respect due to the victims of these experiments. Accordingly, it seems that we have a moral 
reason to refrain from using it. Let us consider the salient features of this reason. An 
important aspect of the respect owed to the Nazi victims is that the respect owed seems to be 
symbolic, in contrast to what we might term concrete moral respect.
215
 To elucidate this 
distinction, consider the moral respect that we might owe to animals. In chapter three, I 
suggested that animals may deserve moral respect by virtue of their sentience, and that this 
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aspect was morally relevant insofar as it is prima facie wrong to cause pain.
216
 Here, a failure 
to afford proper moral respect harms the subject in question; our choice to afford respect to 
an animal has a concrete effect on its welfare. I shall term the form of moral respect which 
has such concrete effects, concrete moral respect. 
   The respect that we owe to the victims of the Nazi experiments is different, since it does not 
seem that our decision to afford proper moral respect now to these deceased victims can have 
any concrete effects on their welfare. One might argue that failing to afford moral respect 
here would harm the families of the victim; however, the example could be altered to 
eliminate this possibility (suppose a civilisation discovered records of the Nazi experiments 
in the distant future). Therefore, in this case, although we may agree that the victims deserve 
moral respect, it is not clear that we can make sense of our decision to afford respect as 
having any concrete effects. Accordingly, it seems appropriate to understand the respect 
owed to the Nazi victims in a different way, as a symbolic moral gesture which we make as 
an expression of our reverence towards the life and suffering of the victims.  
   However, it seems that there are moral reasons in favour of violating this symbolic respect. 
Since the Nazi data could be used to develop new treatments for hypothermia, it could be 
argued that we have a moral reason use the data, insofar as we have a moral reason to 
improve treatments for life threatening conditions.
217
 This seems plausible; as I argued in 
chapter two, we value persons to such an extent that we believe that they warrant the 
protection of a right to life.
218
 Therefore it seems plausible to suppose that we have a moral 
reason to pursue treatments which could protect these lives.  
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   Having said this, it seems that there are limits to the treatments that we have a moral reason 
to pursue, and that certain factors bear on the strength of this moral reason. First, it is not 
clear that we have a moral reason to pursue every medical treatment. For example, it does not 
seem correct to say that we have a moral reason to improve beautifying cosmetic surgery 
methods. One way of distinguishing the treatments that we have a moral reason to pursue, is 
that they correspond to a need rather than a mere want.
219
 We might understand a need to be 
those aspects of health whose impairment threatens one‟s continued existence, or drags one‟s 
life below a minimum standard quality of life.
220
 In contrast, we might define a „want‟ as 
something which will improve one‟s quality of life above this putative minimum standard. 
This opens up the question of how we should define what a minimum standard quality of life 
should be. I cannot attempt to answer this question here; however, it seems plausible to 
suppose that one could formulate an appropriate minimum standard theory.
221
 Assuming that 
this is so, the concept of a treatment corresponding to a need can be a useful framework for 
determining those treatments that we have a moral reason to pursue. 
    There seem to be four factors that bear on the strength of this moral reason in the Nazi data 
case. One factor is the necessity of using the data in order to achieve the benefits promised by 
its use. If researchers cannot find a cure for hypothermia without using the Nazi data, then it 
seems that they have a strong moral reason to use it; however, if we could find a viable cure 
through alternative research, the strength of this reason seems to diminish.
222
 Furthermore, 
the likelihood that using the data research will lead to a viable treatment seems to bear on the 
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strength of the moral reason to use it. Suppose the Nazis had produced a serum which had 
been proved to counteract the effects of hypothermia; it seems that there would be a strong 
reason to use the serum today, if it would be certain to cure sufferers. However, in the case of 
using data in research, there may be no guarantee that using the data will lead to a viable 
cure; as such the moral reason to use it seems weaker.  
  The third factor is the number people who are likely to be benefit from the use of the data. 
In the case we are considering, the comparatively small number of people who are fatally 
threatened by hypothermia may impinge on whether we deem it appropriate to use the data. 
Compare this to a hypothetical case where Nazi data could be used to find a cure for cancer, 
which affects millions of people; it intuitively seems that we would have a stronger moral 
reason to use the data here than in the case of hypothermia.  
   Finally, the immediacy of those will benefit also seems to play a role. Suppose once more 
that the Nazis had developed a serum which could be used to help people now suffering. It 
may plausibly be argued that we would have a stronger moral reason to use the serum than 
we have to use the Nazi data to develop a cure for unknown future sufferers. The justification 
for this view would be that there is a „moral distance‟
223
 between those who choose to use the 
data now, and the people in the future who will benefit from this choice. It might be argued 
that we do not have a strong moral reason to benefit those who are morally distant from us, or 
who we lack an “emotional closeness”
 224
 to. Accordingly, it seems that the immediacy of the 
suffering who could be aided using the Nazi data may be relevant to assessing the strength of 
the moral reason that we have to use it. 
    To conclude this analysis, we can view the judgement of the moral permissibility of using 
the Nazi data as a judgement between two competing moral reasons. On the one hand, we 
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have a moral reason to refrain from using the data insofar as it violates the moral respect due 
to the victims of the experiments. Yet, as section two argued, this gives only a pro tanto 
reason against using the data. Therefore, it may be plausible to claim that the use of this data 
is morally permissible, iff we believe that the moral reasons in favour of using it should 
outweigh this moral reason against using it. Our assessment of the strength of the moral 
reasons in favour of using the data will be based on considerations concerning the severity of 
the condition to be researched, the necessity of using the data to develop a cure, the 
likelihood that using the data will lead to a cure, and the number and immediacy of the people 




   In order to assess the permissibility of violating the moral respect due to embryos in 
therapeutic cloning, I shall first assess the nature of the moral reasons in favour of the 
practice. Having done so, I shall conclude that one may plausibly claim that the moral 
reasons against therapeutic cloning should outweigh those in its favour; accordingly, it is 
plausible to claim that the fourth assumption underlying the compromise position is true. 
However, I shall suggest that there are reasons for doubting the justifications for weighing the 
moral reasons in this way. I shall then conclude this thesis by analysing what ramifications 
this argument has for the tenability of the compromise position. 
   The first point to acknowledge here is that we seem to have a moral reason to engage in 
therapeutic cloning, since the purpose of the practice is to bring about new medical 
treatments which correspond to human needs (as the term was defined in the previous 
section). The diseases that therapeutic cloning could be used to treat are not just diseases or 
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conditions that affect our welfare above what might appropriately be deemed a minimum 
standard; it could be used to treat both fatal diseases, and diseases that might be claimed to 
drag the sufferer‟s life below even conservative estimates of a minimum standard of 
welfare.
225
 As such, given the analysis of the previous section, it seems appropriate to claim 
that we have a moral reason to pursue these treatments. 
    It seems that the salient factors that bore on the strength of the moral reason to use the Nazi 
data analysed above are also relevant to assessing the strength of the moral reason that we 
have to engage in therapeutic cloning. I shall now consider these, before considering why 
they might lead one to accept the fourth assumption underlying the compromise position.  
   The first factor that bore on the strength of the moral reason to use the Nazi data was the 
necessity of using that data in order to obtain the benefits that could be procured by using it. 
As I explained in chapter one, therapeutic cloning may not be a necessary measure, since it is 
not unfeasible that we could develop the cures and techniques it promises through other 
morally unproblematic means, for example through the development of iPSC technology. 
Moreover, there might feasibly be some non-stem cell based alternative research in the future 
which will lead to the cures that therapeutic cloning might provide.  
      The second salient factor considered above was the likelihood that using the Nazi data 
would in fact lead to the benefits that it promises. In the case of therapeutic cloning, there is 
some doubt as to whether carrying out the practice will lead to clinically viable treatments.
226
 
As chapter one pointed out, hESCs have carcinogenic tendencies which render them 
clinically unviable at present, and calls into question the validity of modelling complex 
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 For example, Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis could potentially be cured using therapeutic cloning, and could 
plausibly be included in either category mentioned here 
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 Holm (2003), p. 374 raises this point. 
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diseases using these cells.
 227
  Furthermore, a study by Rideout et al has demonstrated that 
cloned mice bone marrow stem cells that were used in transplants back into the donor mice 
were still recognized as foreign by the recipient.
228
 Again, this study suggests that there are 
still significant obstacles to the clinical use of therapeutic cloning. 
    The third factor considered in the Nazi data case was the number of people that using the 
data could benefit. Putting the above concerns aside, if therapeutic cloning could be 
successfully used in medical research and therapy, it has the potential to provide cures for 
diseases which affect millions of people.
229
 On the face of it, this third factor seems to 
strengthen the moral reason that we have to engage in the practice. However, since there will 
be a gap between permitting the practice of therapeutic cloning and the development of viable 
cures through its use, the benefactors of the practice will be future sufferers of the disease, 
rather than people who are now suffering. As we saw in the case of the Nazi data, some might 
claim that a fourth salient factor that bears on the strength of a moral reason to carry out some 
practice is the immediacy of the benefactors of that practice; as such, some might claim that 
the moral distance between ourselves and future sufferers weakens the moral reason that we 
have to engage in therapeutic cloning. 
      With all this in mind, it seems that a case can be made in favour of the fourth assumption 
underlying the compromise position. Although considerations of moral respect provide only a 
pro tanto moral reason to judge that therapeutic cloning is morally impermissible, it may be 
argued that the moral reasons we have to engage in the practice are insufficient to 
outweighing this pro tanto moral reason. Such a claim could be justified in one of three ways.  
                                                          
227
 See pp. 11-12. 
228
 Rideout et al (2002), cited in The President’s Council on Bioethics (2002), p. 77.  
229
 See pp 9-11. 
105 
 
   The first two justifications rely on moral claims. First, one may claim that moral reasons to 
refrain from acting should outweigh moral reasons in favour of acting; that is to say our 
negative duties ought to trump our positive duties.
230
 Foot endorses this claim; she claims that 
“Typically, it takes more to justify an interference than to justify the withholding of goods or 
services”. 
231
 If this is the case, then it might be argued that the moral reason that we have to 
refrain from therapeutic cloning should outweigh the moral reasons in its favour. 
   Second, as I explained above, one may claim that we do not have strong moral reason to act 
for the benefit of future sufferers, because of the moral distance between us and future 
generations. This claim could be used to justify the fourth assumption by arguing that it is 




    Finally, a third justification for claiming that the moral reasons in favour of therapeutic 
cloning are insufficient to outweigh the moral reasons against the practice is the empirical 
claim that therapeutic cloning is either unnecessary or unlikely to lead to viable treatments. 
As I mentioned above, there is some justification for this claim at present, given the 
significant obstacles facing the use of therapeutic cloning in both research and therapy. 
      It should be acknowledged that I am only claiming that the above justifications are 
plausible; I do not claim that they are convincing, and I shall give some reasons for this 
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 One could also support the compromise position with the concept of moral distance by arguing that the 
moral considerations we owe to current sufferers should outweigh those we owe to morally distant future 
sufferers; in this argument, the claim would be that we should prioritise developing cures for current sufferers 
over developing therapeutic cloning technology, since the latter will only benefit future sufferers. I do not 
consider this argument here, because it cannot justify the fourth assumption that I am considering. This 
argument does not claim that therapeutic cloning is wrong because the moral reasons in favour of the practice 
are insufficient to outweighing the moral reasons against the practice provided by the idea that it violates the 
respect owed to embryos. Rather, it claims that therapeutic cloning is wrong because it prioritises the morally 
distant over the morally immediate. As such, it is orthogonal to my discussion of the fourth assumption. 
However, some considerations that I shall give concerning the validity of the concept of moral distance will 
also be pertinent to the validity of this alternative defence of the compromise position. 
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below. However, I cannot deny that if one accepts the claims underlying one of the above 
justifications, then it is possible to assent to the truth of the fourth assumption underlying the 
compromise position. Therefore, in conjunction with my defence of the other assumptions 
underlying the compromise position, since there are plausible justifications for accepting the 
fourth assumption, I must conclude that the compromise position is tenable. Having said this, 
there is still scope for claiming that the position is unappealing. Given that this thesis is 
investigating the tenability of the compromise position, and not its appeal, I can only offer a 
brief defence of the arguments that could be given in favour of this conclusion here.  
   First, let us reconsider the moral reason against carrying out therapeutic cloning provided 
by the moral respect owed to embryos. It seems correct to say that the respect owed to 
embryos according to proponents of the compromise position is symbolic, rather than 
concrete. As I argued in chapter five, in claiming that standard hESC research is compatible 
with affording the proper moral respect owed to embryos, proponents of the compromise 
position are committed to the thought that creating an embryo in order to destroy it for 
reproductive purposes is compatible with affording it proper moral respect. Accordingly, our 
decision to afford respect in the context of hESC research does not seem to have any concrete 
effects on the welfare of the embryo (assuming that it is even coherent to talk about the 
embryo‟s welfare at all); whether or not we decide to afford moral respect to the embryo, we 
still deem it morally permissible to destroy it. As such, it seems that the decision to violate 
respect here is symbolic of an inappropriate disregard of the embryo‟s potential, rather than 
concrete. 
   In light of this, let us reconsider the putative justifications for the fourth assumption given 
above. First, the principle that moral reasons to refrain from acting should normally outweigh 
the moral reasons that we have for acting is not unimpeachable; according to some moral 
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theories this is an illusory distinction.
233
 Yet, even if the principle is sound, its application in 
this case is questionable because the moral reasons that we are weighing in the case of 
therapeutic cloning refer to entities which we believe deserve different moral considerations. 
On the one hand, affording moral respect to the embryo is a symbolic act; it has no concrete 
effect on the welfare of the respected. On the other hand, our decision to act in accordance 
with the moral reasons in favour of therapeutic cloning would have concrete effects on fully 
developed persons.
234
 It seems possible to argue that the moral considerations that we have 
for sufferers of severe diseases have a greater moral gravity than the considerations that we 
owe to embryos because of this distinction.
235
 Accordingly, there are reasons for doubting 
whether the principle that the first justification relies on is applicable in the case of 
therapeutic cloning, even if we assume that it is sound. 
   The second justification concerning the concept of moral distance is also unappealing. The 
concept of moral distance can be used to justify the fourth assumption by arguing that the 
moral respect owed to embryos should outweigh the moral considerations owed to future 
suffers. The first thing to acknowledge here is that we also seem to lack an emotional 
closeness to both SCNT and unwanted embryos; after all, they are not part of a parental 
project, and they do not yet have the capacities which make life particularly valuable. As 
such, although we can make sense of having moral considerations for these embryos, it seems 
that they too are morally distant to us to some extent, albeit in a different sense from future 
generations, who are morally distant in a temporal sense. 
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 i.e. Those who suffer from the diseases that therapeutic cloning promises to cure. 
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 This thought can also be used to reply to thin end of the wedge arguments that can be aimed at opponents 
of the fourth assumption, namely that if we violate the respect due to embryos for certain benefits, this will 
lead us to violate the respect due to other entities for other benefits. In reply, I would argue that it is possible 
to distinguish the symbolic respect owed to embryos from concrete moral respect and rights claims because of 




    As such, in weighing the moral considerations that we have for future generations and for 
SCNT embryos, it seems that we are weighing moral considerations for things which are both 
morally distant to us. To argue then that the moral reasons we have to respect embryos should 
outweigh the moral reasons to benefit future sufferers again seems to overlook the moral 
gravity of the considerations involved. Although there may be a moral distance between us 
and future sufferers, we can still conceive of them as developed persons who will suffer, and 
who can be concretely benefitted by our choices. In contrast, the respect we owe to embryos, 
which are also morally distant to us, is merely symbolic. Again, it seems plausible to argue 
that the former considerations have greater moral gravity than the latter.  
   Alternatively, one could just question the whole concept of moral distance.
236
 Consider this 
case: Suppose that we could use our resources in a manner which would be almost certain to 
lead to significant benefits for a morally distant group. Suppose further, that the alternative 
way to spend our resources would be to use them in research which had a remote chance of 
benefitting those we have an emotional closeness to. To use the concept of moral distance to 
argue that we should use our resources in the latter research instead of the former seems 
inappropriate.
 237
 It does not seem that our moral considerations for those that we have an 
emotional closeness to should take lexical priority over our moral considerations to the 
morally distant in this way. Therefore, it is possible to question the validity of the whole 
concept of moral distance. Glover claims that the concept is a merely „defence mechanism‟ 
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against psychological discomfort (albeit a useful one).
238




   Moreover, even if the concept is valid, there might even be scope for challenging the idea 
that there will be a significant moral distance between the current generation and the 
benefactors of therapeutic cloning. For instance, it is not unfeasible that the grandchildren or 
even children of the current generation could benefit from the practice; it certainly seems odd 
to claim that we have a moral distance to these benefactors. As such, it seems that there are 
three plausible ways to object to the second justification for accepting the fourth assumption. 
   Finally, one may use the empirical claim that therapeutic cloning is either unnecessary, or 
unlikely to lead to the benefits it promises, in order to justify the fourth assumption. As I 
suggested above, therapeutic cloning may not be necessary because there may be other means 
of attaining the benefits it promises. Having said this, it still seems that therapeutic cloning 
represents the most realistic chance of attaining these cures at present. First, as chapter one 
explained, the clinical use of iPSCs is a more distant possibility than the clinical use of 
therapeutic cloning.
240
 Second, we cannot just assume that some other future alternative 
morally unproblematic research will lead to the same cures as therapeutic cloning; for certain 
diseases, therapeutic cloning currently represents the sole lead in the hunt for a cure.
241
  
   Therefore, to accept the fourth assumption on the basis that therapeutic cloning may not be 
necessary is unappealing. To do so amounts to claiming that we should spend significantly 
more resources and time developing the cures promised by therapeutic cloning through other 
means, all in the name of the moral respect owed to embryos. Given the discussion 
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concerning the contrast between the moral gravity of the respect owed to embryos and the 
considerations that we owe to sufferers of severe diseases, this seems unappealing. 
   Furthermore, the fact that there are questions concerning the likelihood that therapeutic 
cloning will lead to the benefits it promises is not an appealing basis for accepting the fourth 
assumption. A significant contributing factor of the obstacles facing therapeutic cloning is a 
lack of understanding of the cell differentiation that occurs in hESCs; once scientists have a 
better understanding of this, it is feasible that they will be able to negate the carcinogenic 
tendencies of these cells. Moreover, it is likely that increased understanding will lead to more 
reliable methods of disease modelling using these cells. Researcher may be able to increase 
their understanding of the cell differentiation that hESCs in two ways. First, they may do so 
by studying cell differentiation in animal embryonic stem cells and hESCs derived from 
unwanted embryos. However, it might be argued that the most promising way in which 
researchers could increase their understanding of the obstacles facing the clinical use of 
therapeutic cloning, is by carrying out research on cloned hESCs. As such, carrying out 
therapeutic cloning may hold the key to overcoming the very technical obstacles facing its 
clinical use. 
   Therefore, in order to come to an informed decision about the strength of the moral reasons 
in favour of therapeutic cloning, ethicists need to have a detailed, unbiased account of the 
likelihood that the technical obstacles facing its clinical use can be overcome, and how we 
can best overcome them; that there are such obstacles should not lead us to conclude that we 
do not have a strong moral reason to engage in the practice, especially if the most promising 
way in which we can overcome these obstacles is by engaging in the practice. 
    The above considerations provide a framework of how we might argue that the fourth 
assumption underlying the compromise position is unappealing. In the conclusion of this 
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    Therefore, to offer a succinct answer to the question that I have investigated in this thesis, 
the compromise position concerning the moral permissibility of different forms of hESC 
research is a tenable, but unappealing position. In the first chapter of this thesis, I claimed 
that the tenability of the compromise position depends on the soundness of four assumptions. 
In chapters two through to five, I found that three of these assumptions are warranted: First, I 
argued that the embryo does not have a right to life. Second, I argued that we can make sense 
of there being moral constraints upon the way in which we treat embryos, without ascribing 
rights to them. I argued that we can articulate these constraints using the language of moral 
respect, and that it is coherent to view the embryo as deserving moral respect by virtue of its 
potential. Third, I argued that there is a moral difference between standard hESC research, 
and therapeutic cloning, such that in carrying out the latter, but not the former, we violate the 
moral respect due to the embryo. The justification for this view was that only the latter 
practice fails to acknowledge the embryo‟s potential in any way.  
    Finally, in chapter six I argued that it may be plausible to assent to the truth of the fourth 
premise underlying the compromise position; namely that it is morally impermissible to fail 
to act in accordance with the constraints delineated in the second assumption. I argued that 
there are seemingly plausible justifications claiming that the moral reasons against 
therapeutic cloning provided by the idea that we owe moral respect to embryos should be 
deemed to outweigh the moral reasons in favour of the practice. Accordingly, I concluded 
that the compromise position is tenable. However, I also suggested that all of the 
justifications for weighing the moral reasons in this way are dubious. As such, although I 
could not fully defend this view here, I suggested that the compromise position is also an 
unappealing position.    
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   The argument I have made here offers a new perspective on the debate concerning the 
compromise position, since it concedes far more to its adherents than most of its opponents, 
whilst claiming that the position is ultimately unappealing. Contrary to both liberal and 
conservative opponents of the position, I have argued that there is a coherent moral 
distinction to be made between the two forms of hESC research, based on the concept of 
moral respect. However, the considerations I raised questioning the justifications underlying 
the fourth assumption suggest that we should agree with liberal opponents of the compromise 
position that therapeutic cloning is morally permissible, in view of the moral reasons that we 
have to engage in the practice. 
   Optimistically, I might hope that the proposals which I have made can shift the debate 
concerning the compromise position from questions concerning its tenability to questions 
concerning its appeal. The current debate concerning the compromise position has focused on 
the coherence of drawing a moral distinction between the two hESC research methods and 
questions of embryonic rights. I am sceptical of any reconciliation between the two opposing 
sides in these debates, since there are significant differences in each side‟s understanding of 
key concepts in the debate; one example of this seems to be each side‟s understanding of the 
moral value of the embryo‟s potential, as I discussed in chapter four.
242
 However, in my 
argument, I have conceded ground to proponents of the compromise position in both of these 
contested questions, whilst maintaining that the compromise position is ultimately 
unappealing. Even if one disagrees with my assessment here, I hope that I have demonstrated 
that questions concerning the fourth assumption are the actual central issue in this debate. 
    Considering that a large part of this thesis has been concerned with formulating a model of 
moral respect, my conclusion that there are plausible moral reasons for claiming that 
therapeutic cloning may be deemed morally permissible even if it violates the moral respect 
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due to the embryo may seem to render my conception of moral respect weak to the point of 
inadequacy. However, I believe that the model of moral respect that I have developed is 
important, because it can influence our moral understanding of what it means to engage in 
therapeutic cloning.  
    According to my argument, therapeutic cloning fails to afford proper moral respect to the 
embryo. Even if we claim that the morals reasons that we have to engage in therapeutic 
cloning should outweigh the moral reasons that we have to refrain from the practice (as I 
suggested that we should), these latter reasons against the practice do not fade. I believe that 
there are three important implications of this. First, although the practice may be deemed 
morally permissible given the countervailing moral reasons in its favour, we should 
acknowledge the moral reasons that weigh against our decision by exhibiting an appropriate 
reactive attitude to the violation of moral respect that our decision entails. Although remorse 
may not be appropriate, given the moral permissibility of our act, it seems appropriate to 
regret the fact that what we have most pressing moral reason to do requires the violation of 
moral respect.  
   Second, as I argued in chapter six, in order for the moral reasons in favour of engaging in 
therapeutic cloning to be sufficient to outweigh the moral reasons against the practice, we 
should only use this form of hESC research to treat diseases which correspond to a human 
need rather than a mere want. Finally, if some means of achieving the same ends as 
therapeutic cloning becomes available, which does not face additional obstacles to its 
implementation to those faced by therapeutic cloning, this may render the latter morally 
impermissible (if there are no moral reasons against engaging in this new practice). 
   To conclude, the compromise position on the moral permissibility of hESC research is 
tenable, since it is possible to assent to the truth of all four of its underlying assumptions. 
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Having said this, there are reasons for doubting the assumption that it is morally 
impermissible to violate the moral respect due to the embryo. Therefore, I also suggest that 
the compromise position is unappealing. Although this thesis has not provided a conclusive 
reason against accepting the fourth assumption, it seems that both sides of the debate 
concerning the compromise position on hESC research could profit from contemplating this 
assumption in more detail. I propose that this would result in a more fruitful discussion 
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